Daily Papers

World-action models (WAMs) are emerging as a promising foundation for embodied control: rather than predicting actions alone, they learn representations that couple action generation with future world prediction. This coupling is often viewed as a source of robustness, interpretability, and safety, as a robot's action can in principle be checked against its imagined future. In this paper, we show that this assumption is fragile. We introduce BadWAM, a unified framework for modeling and evaluating World-Action Drift Attacks: a new class of WAM-specific adversarial attacks that use small visual perturbations to break the alignment between what a WAM imagines and what it executes. BadWAM characterizes this attack surface along two natural criteria: attack strength and stealthiness. When the adversary prioritizes disruption, BadWAM instantiates an action-only adversarial attack, which directly drives the model toward task-failing actions. When the adversary additionally prioritizes stealth, BadWAM instantiates an imagination-preserving adversarial attack, which seeks to induce harmful action shifts while keeping the model's predicted future close to its clean imagination. Together, these two attacks capture a spectrum of WAM-specific failures: from overt action hijacking to stealthier cases where the model appears to imagine a plausible future but executes a desynchronized action. We evaluate BadWAM across different variants of WAMs. Results show that our attacks substantially reduce task success rates under closed-loop execution. For example, our action-only attack reduces the model performance from 96.5% to 43.1% success. The results of our imagination-preserving attack further exposes a WAM-specific vulnerability: moderate future-preserving regularization can maintain strong attack performance while reducing future imagination drift.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.

Visual world models (VWMs) synthesize interactive, action-conditioned rollouts from a single context image. However, it remains an open question how robust these models are to adversarial perturbations. Standard adversarial attacks fail to assess this vulnerability because attackers lack ground-truth future videos and cannot predict subsequent user controls. We introduce BadWorld, a label-free adversarial framework tailored for autoregressive VWMs that systematically overcomes both constraints. First, to bypass the need for future supervision, we propose a self-supervised velocity attack that directly disrupts the early denoising dynamics of the model. Second, to ensure the attack generalizes across unpredictable user actions, we formulate a trajectory-adaptive bi-level optimization that actively mines hard control sequences to forge control-agnostic perturbations. Evaluated on representative VWMs with continuous and discrete controls, BadWorld exposes severe structural fragility. Visually indistinguishable adversarial images reliably trigger catastrophic degradation in future rollouts, leading to incomplete denoising, structural collapse, and control inconsistency. These findings reveal critical risks for deploying VWMs in safety-critical systems while highlighting a practical mechanism for privacy protection.

Generative world models (WMs) are increasingly used to synthesize controllable, sensor-conditioned driving videos, yet their reliance on physical priors exposes novel attack surfaces. In this paper, we present Physical-Conditioned World Model Attack (PhysCond-WMA), the first white-box world model attack that perturbs physical-condition channels, such as HDMap embeddings and 3D-box features, to induce semantic, logic, or decision-level distortion while preserving perceptual fidelity. PhysCond-WMA is optimized in two stages: (1) a quality-preserving guidance stage that constrains reverse-diffusion loss below a calibrated threshold, and (2) a momentum-guided denoising stage that accumulates target-aligned gradients along the denoising trajectory for stable, temporally coherent semantic shifts. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach remains effective while increasing FID by about 9% on average and FVD by about 3.9% on average. Under the targeted attack setting, the attack success rate (ASR) reaches 0.55. Downstream studies further show tangible risk, which using attacked videos for training decreases 3D detection performance by about 4%, and worsens open-loop planning performance by about 20%. These findings has for the first time revealed and quantified security vulnerabilities in generative world models, driving more comprehensive security checkers.

Flow-matching vision-language-action (VLA) models such as pi0 generate robot actions by integrating a learned denoising velocity field, and have been reported to resist adversarial perturbations that readily fool autoregressive VLAs. We show that this robustness is largely illusory: it stems from prior attacks ignoring the multi-step denoising ODE. We introduce DRIFT (Denoising Redirection via Input perturbation of the Flow-matching Trajectory), a test-time universal adversarial patch placed on the robot's gripper that attacks the denoising velocity field of an off-the-shelf policy. Our central finding is counterintuitive: attacking only the first denoising step is both stronger and cheaper than attacking a wider window of steps, which we explain through a gradient conflict unique to input-space optimization and which is exactly opposite to the training-time backdoor regime. On pi0 and pi0.5 across four LIBERO suites, DRIFT breaks essentially all originally-solvable tasks with a small single patch, far exceeding action- and embedding-space attack baselines.

Predictive world models enable robots to plan by imagining the outcomes of their actions, but their value for control hinges on generating many rollouts quickly. This creates a bottleneck for diffusion-based world models: multistep sampling makes each rollout expensive, limiting large-scale action search at inference time. We introduce DriftWorld, an action-conditioned world model based on drifting generative models. Rather than denoising iteratively at inference, DriftWorld learns an action-conditioned drift during training, allowing it to generate future frames from the current observation and a candidate action sequence in a single forward pass at 30+ fps, which is 17x faster on average than diffusion based baselines. We evaluate DriftWorld on standard vision-based robotic manipulation benchmarks, including Bridge-V2, RT-1, Language Table, Push-T, and Robomimic. By producing rollouts that are both accurate and fast, DriftWorld achieves state-of-the-art decision-making performance with far less inference time than diffusion-based world model baselines. Beyond online control, DriftWorld can also serve as an offline simulator for ranking real-world robot policies, with rollout-based scores correlating with ground truth at up to 0.99. These results show that drifting models are a strong fit for robot world modeling, where fast, high-quality imagination directly supports planning and policy evaluation.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned action detection in CUAs, with comprehensive coverage of both externally induced and internally arising misaligned actions. We further identify three common categories in real-world CUA deployment and construct MisActBench, a benchmark of realistic trajectories with human-annotated, action-level alignment labels. Moreover, we propose DeAction, a practical and universal guardrail that detects misaligned actions before execution and iteratively corrects them through structured feedback. DeAction outperforms all existing baselines across offline and online evaluations with moderate latency overhead: (1) On MisActBench, it outperforms baselines by over 15% absolute in F1 score; (2) In online evaluation, it reduces attack success rate by over 90% under adversarial settings while preserving or even improving task success rate in benign environments.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

Game world models have made rapid progress toward real-time interactive generation. Yet action control is still predominantly implemented as feature conditioning, leaving the model to learn from training data how each action should move the visual world. This formulation is poorly matched to a broad class of planar-camera worlds, such as top-down and isometric games. In these worlds, player motion induces a geometrically well-defined planar camera displacement. We observe that the key to spatially consistent control in such worlds is to represent the effect of each action directly in world coordinates. To this end, we introduce ActionRoPE, a parameter-free action interface that converts action-driven camera displacement into world-coordinate rotary positions. As a result, tokens corresponding to the same world location retain the same positional address across time. These world coordinates further expose a spatial asymmetry in generation: regions covered by the initial observation are geometrically known, while newly revealed regions remain to be synthesized. We therefore propose Coordinate-Conditioned Noise Scheduling (CNS), which assigns token-wise denoising schedules according to this known-new structure. It allows observed regions to stabilize earlier, while new content is generated with reference to them. Compared with four representative action-conditioning mechanisms, our approach follows the commanded motion more faithfully and reduces the revisit drift by 66% over the strongest baseline. The same interface transfers across video backbones from 1.3B to 33B parameters and to out-of-distribution scenes. Project Page: https://teawhite.cn/ActionRoPE/

World Action Models (WAMs) improve planning by incorporating future world evolution into action generation, yet existing methods allocate a fixed imagination budget to every scene. We propose RISE (Refining Imagination through SElective Rollout), a system-level adaptive imagination framework that makes sequential Roll/Stop decisions according to the expected planning benefit of continued rollout. At each step, a Latent Evaluator estimates the risk revealed by the current prefix and how much planning could improve if imagination continues, while a Rollout Gate weighs this expected benefit against additional computation cost. Since factual driving logs expose only one realized future, we further construct CounterDrive, a counterfactual dataset with diverse outcomes and risk levels, to enrich future dynamics and provide localized risk supervision. Each retained sample undergoes expert verification and annotation of trajectory validity, incident onset, and causal category, providing a reusable resource for safety-critical world-modeling research. Experiments on NAVSIM and nuScenes show that RISE achieves the best overall planning performance while reducing unnecessary rollout, with additional transfer results supporting its plug-in generality across WAM architectures.

For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.

Despite rapid progress in interactive world models (IWMs), existing benchmarks evaluate action following only at trajectory level and ignore memory and interaction physics. We introduce WorldOdysseyBench, an open-world benchmark for long-horizon stability across four dimensions, each with tailored innovations: (i) Action: per-frame action metric bypassing cross-model semantic scale disparity and exposing failures hidden by trajectory; (ii) Vision: segment-based drift metric capturing non-monotonic mid-sequence collapse missed by start-vs-end comparisons; (iii) Physics: controllability-gated evaluation over mechanics, optics, and 3D consistency, scoring plausibility under faithful action execution; (iv) Memory: action-decoupled protocol evaluating scene memory via transition-localized 3D point-cloud reconstruction and subject memory via tracking-plus-VLM reasoning. The benchmark comprises 600+ test cases across Nature, Urban, and Indoor scenes in first/third-person views with WASD 10-60s continuous interaction. Evaluating 10+ open/closed-source models reveals none reliably satisfies all dimensions; even the best achieves only moderate scores. Advances on WorldOdysseyBench are steps toward IWMs that are stable, physically grounded, memory-faithful, and deployable in real-world applications.

Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to +3.6 points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation.

This paper presents WorldPlay, a streaming video diffusion model that enables real-time, interactive world modeling with long-term geometric consistency, resolving the trade-off between speed and memory that limits current methods. WorldPlay draws power from three key innovations. 1) We use a Dual Action Representation to enable robust action control in response to the user's keyboard and mouse inputs. 2) To enforce long-term consistency, our Reconstituted Context Memory dynamically rebuilds context from past frames and uses temporal reframing to keep geometrically important but long-past frames accessible, effectively alleviating memory attenuation. 3) We also propose Context Forcing, a novel distillation method designed for memory-aware model. Aligning memory context between the teacher and student preserves the student's capacity to use long-range information, enabling real-time speeds while preventing error drift. Taken together, WorldPlay generates long-horizon streaming 720p video at 24 FPS with superior consistency, comparing favorably with existing techniques and showing strong generalization across diverse scenes. Project page and online demo can be found: https://3d-models.hunyuan.tencent.com/world/ and https://3d.hunyuan.tencent.com/sceneTo3D.

World models learn to predict how their environment will evolve, making them an important foundation for general-purpose robotic control. Yet world action models depend on camera inputs whose manipulation can corrupt the visual representations used across tasks and action policies. Existing attacks on these models optimize against the victim's actions or predicted futures and therefore require access to target-model outputs. In this paper, we propose an attack, TAPDreamer, against world action models that instead uses a public encoder alone to construct a fixed local perturbation that transfers across tasks and action architectures. TAPDreamer requires no target-policy queries. Our key insight is that interactions between patch-induced changes in attention weights and value vectors broadcast a nearly identical representation shift far beyond the patch footprint, and this shift remains stable across task observations. Guided by this insight, TAPDreamer uses six frames from one source task to maximize the global L1 distance between clean and patched encoder representations. In closed-loop evaluation, one frozen patch per benchmark, covering about 6.5% of the input, reduces FastWAM's success rate from 97.7% to 0.0% across 40 LIBERO tasks and from 90.86% to 0.0% across 50 RoboTwin tasks; matched random patches retain 81.5% and 79.2% success. The same patches reduce success to 1.45% and 1.00% on two DreamWAM configurations and to 10.60% on Motus. These results show that protecting downstream action generation alone is insufficient: defenses for world action models must also secure shared visual encoders against persistent local perturbations.

Interactive video world models are essential for long-horizon planning and exploration, yet they suffer from compounding errors. Post-training methods such as reinforcement learning (RL) can improve these models, but they hit a verification bottleneck: for arbitrary action sequences, no ground-truth future state exists to measure long-term drift. Our key insight is that reversible action cycles make this verification possible: a sequence composed with its inverse must analytically return to the initial state, yielding annotation-free supervision on long-horizon correctness. Building on this, we introduce WorldCycle, a self-verifiable RL framework that constructs closed action cycles and their repeated executions from ordinary action sequences, and optimizes two complementary rewards: a spatial closure reward enforcing symmetry between mirrored forward and reverse segments, and a temporal consistency reward aligning states across repeated cycle executions. These rewards force the model to learn actions as consistent state operators rather than memorized temporal patterns, and extend naturally to out-of-distribution composite action cycles that the base model handles poorly. We further release CycleBench, a diagnostic benchmark for state-returning ability under complex action structures. WorldCycle reduces state returning drift by up to 44% and lifts composite-action accuracy nearly 4x over the base model, providing a vital foundation for physically grounded world models.

Language-model agents increasingly use tools to act on external systems. Earlier actions can alter files, permissions, database records, or other state, making a later routine-looking action harmful. Yet the visible interaction may not reveal the underlying state needed to assess that action. We formulate attack and defense as partially observed state control in SEAD, deriving their design requirements from this shared execution process. Because attackers supply instructions while the target chooses concrete actions, DART decomposes harmful goals into locally plausible steps and uses feedback from actual tool execution to guide trajectory search. The defender must decide before execution with incomplete state evidence. SAGE can therefore investigate relevant state through read-only queries before allowing or blocking each action, including those proposed after a block. We construct an environment-verifiable dataset integrating controlled initial states, replayable tool environments, and task-specific executable checks. Across four target models, DART improves semantic attack success by 18.8--35.9 percentage points over the competing baseline, with consistent gains under executable verification. On recorded trajectories, SAGE preserves 95.79% of benign trajectories while intercepting 92.73% of harmful paths by the harm-enabling boundary. In online attack-defense evaluation, it reduces DART's executable attack success from 48.0% to 4.0%. SAGE remains effective across four attack methods and generalizes to out-of-domain environments. Our code and data is available at https://github.com/EverywhereSafety/SEAD.

World Action Models (WAMs) are embodied predictive-action models that make a forecast of the future available to action. Recent WAMs repurpose large video generation models, and a parallel line relies on language or vision-language backbones without a video-generation core. This rapid expansion has blurred the boundary among broad world models, video generation models, action-grounded video world models, Vision-Language-Action policies, and WAMs. This survey gives the field a common account. It first clarifies these boundaries, then organizes existing works through two complementary views. The first view asks what each method is required to generate, spanning rendered futures, latent futures, and video-generation-free action reasoning. The second view decomposes each method by predictive substrate, backbone, action coupling, and deployment regime. This anatomy supports a unified discussion of interactability, causality, persistence, physical plausibility, and generalization, followed by data, evaluation, and open challenges. Across these axes, a consistent design pattern emerges: WAMs are not simply video generators with action heads, but predictive-action methods whose design choices trade representational richness against compute, memory, latency, and action-label cost. The field is moving toward methods that generate less of the future while preserving what control requires. The survey homepage is available at https://world-action-models.github.io/.

World action models (WAMs) condition robot actions on predicted futures, but iterative video rollout increases deployment latency. We ask whether action generation requires the evolving rollout trajectory or only its future representation. Across four WAMs on all 40 LIBERO tasks, paired closed-loop interventions show that masking or reassigning future-cache values changes execution and reduces success, indicating sensitivity to future values and their assigned positions. For Joint and Cosmos-2, however, replaying one fixed final-clean key/value (K/V) cache nearly preserves unmodified execution, with 1.7 to 1.9~cm end-effector average displacement error and 97.9% to 98.2% success. This separates cache consumption from production: these models can reuse a fixed cache but still require iterative rollout to construct it. We therefore propose RIFT (Rollout-free Imagination via Future Tokens), which uses learned anticipation tokens to construct a complete future K/V cache in one backbone pass while retaining the original future-read interface. On LIBERO, RIFT achieves 98.8% success, close to rollout-based Joint, IDM, and LingBot-VA at 98.4% to 98.6%, while reducing action-chunk latency by 68.2% to 89.1%. On RoboTwin~2.0, RIFT reaches 92.9/92.6% on clean/randomized scenes, the highest observed among the evaluated methods. These results support rollout-free future conditioning without iterative video generation at deployment.

The rapid development of autonomous web agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), while greatly elevating efficiency, exposes the frontier risk of taking unintended or harmful actions. This situation underscores an urgent need for effective safety measures, akin to access controls for human users. To address this critical challenge, we introduce WebGuard, the first comprehensive dataset designed to support the assessment of web agent action risks and facilitate the development of guardrails for real-world online environments. In doing so, WebGuard specifically focuses on predicting the outcome of state-changing actions and contains 4,939 human-annotated actions from 193 websites across 22 diverse domains, including often-overlooked long-tail websites. These actions are categorized using a novel three-tier risk schema: SAFE, LOW, and HIGH. The dataset includes designated training and test splits to support evaluation under diverse generalization settings. Our initial evaluations reveal a concerning deficiency: even frontier LLMs achieve less than 60% accuracy in predicting action outcomes and less than 60% recall in lagging HIGH-risk actions, highlighting the risks of deploying current-generation agents without dedicated safeguards. We therefore investigate fine-tuning specialized guardrail models using WebGuard. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple generalization settings and find that a fine-tuned Qwen2.5VL-7B model yields a substantial improvement in performance, boosting accuracy from 37% to 80% and HIGH-risk action recall from 20% to 76%. Despite these improvements, the performance still falls short of the reliability required for high-stakes deployment, where guardrails must approach near-perfect accuracy and recall.

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems have emerged as powerful architectures for complex task decomposition and collaborative problem-solving. However, their long-term behavioral stability remains largely unexamined. This study introduces the concept of agent drift, defined as the progressive degradation of agent behavior, decision quality, and inter-agent coherence over extended interaction sequences. We present a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding drift phenomena, proposing three distinct manifestations: semantic drift (progressive deviation from original intent), coordination drift (breakdown in multi-agent consensus mechanisms), and behavioral drift (emergence of unintended strategies). We introduce the Agent Stability Index (ASI), a novel composite metric framework for quantifying drift across twelve dimensions, including response consistency, tool usage patterns, reasoning pathway stability, and inter-agent agreement rates. Through simulation-based analysis and theoretical modeling, we demonstrate how unchecked agent drift can lead to substantial reductions in task completion accuracy and increased human intervention requirements. We propose three mitigation strategies: episodic memory consolidation, drift-aware routing protocols, and adaptive behavioral anchoring. Theoretical analysis suggests these approaches can significantly reduce drift-related errors while maintaining system throughput. This work establishes a foundational methodology for monitoring, measuring, and mitigating agent drift in production agentic AI systems, with direct implications for enterprise deployment reliability and AI safety research.

Interactive video generation models such as Genie, YUME, HY-World, and Matrix-Game are advancing rapidly, yet every model is evaluated on its own benchmark with private scenes and trajectories, making fair cross-model comparison impossible. Existing public benchmarks offer useful metrics such as trajectory error, aesthetic scores, and VLM-based judgments, but none supplies the standardized test conditions -- identical scenes, identical action sequences, and a unified control interface -- needed to make those metrics comparable across models with heterogeneous inputs. We introduce WorldMark, the first benchmark that provides such a common playing field for interactive Image-to-Video world models. WorldMark contributes: (1) a unified action-mapping layer that translates a shared WASD-style action vocabulary into each model's native control format, enabling apples-to-apples comparison across six major models on identical scenes and trajectories; (2) a hierarchical test suite of 500 evaluation cases covering first- and third-person viewpoints, photorealistic and stylized scenes, and three difficulty tiers from Easy to Hard spanning 20-60s; and (3) a modular evaluation toolkit for Visual Quality, Control Alignment, and World Consistency, designed so that researchers can reuse our standardized inputs while plugging in their own metrics as the field evolves. We will release all data, evaluation code, and model outputs to facilitate future research. Beyond offline metrics, we launch World Model Arena (warena.ai), an online platform where anyone can pit leading world models against each other in side-by-side battles and watch the live leaderboard.

A plausible scene evolution depends on the maneuver being considered, while a good maneuver depends on how the scene may evolve. Existing World Action Models (WAMs) largely miss this reciprocity, treating world prediction and action generation as either isolated parallel branches or rigid predict-then-plan pipelines. We formalize this perspective as World-Action Interactive Models (WAIMs), and instantiate it in autonomous driving with DAWN (Denoising Actions and World iNteractive model), a simple yet strong latent generative baseline. DAWN operates in a compact semantic latent space and couples a World Predictor with a World-Conditioned Action Denoiser: the predicted world hypothesis conditions action denoising, while the denoised action hypothesis is fed back to update the world prediction, so that both are recursively refined during inference. Rather than eliminating test-time world evolution altogether or rolling out the full future in pixel space, DAWN performs a short explicit latent rollout that is sufficient to support long-horizon trajectory generation in complex interactive scenes. Experiments show that DAWN achieves strong planning performance and favorable safety-related results across multiple autonomous driving benchmarks. More broadly, our results suggest that interactive world-action generation is a principled path toward truly actionable world models.

We introduce WorldOracle, a benchmark specifically designed to evaluate action-conditioned world models (ACWMs) against paired real-world executions. Given the same initial observation and low-level action sequence, WorldOracle asks whether a predicted rollout reproduces what happens in the real world, including physical consequences and task-state transitions. We evaluate models along four complementary dimensions: physical state correctness, interaction spatial alignment, key interaction area fidelity, and multi-view action coherence. To support this evaluation, we curate real-world training and evaluation suites that cover different interaction dynamics and embodiments. The evaluation suite contains long, multi-segment episodes with both successful and failed executions, enabling evaluation across varied action outcomes and behavior distributions. Experiments on seven representative ACWMs reveal distinct model strengths and failure modes. WorldOracle provides a systematic foundation for measuring and advancing action-conditioned world modeling for manipulation. We will release the datasets, evaluation code, and leaderboard.

World Action Models (WAMs) incorporate visual representations from video generation backbones to guide action prediction. Recent efficient WAMs adopt Mixture-of-Transformers (MoT) architectures and compute video representations once for reuse by the action expert. However, intra-expert iteration (\ie, multi-step action denoising) and inter-expert waiting (\ie, sequential execution of the video and action experts) still limit inference efficiency. To this end, we present RealtimeWAM, an extremely efficient WAM variant with one-step action generation and asynchronous inference, addressing these two bottlenecks. To reduce intra-expert iteration, we propose Teacher-Anchored Consistency Distillation (TACD) to address a local-global error gap: low local consistency error alone does not guarantee accurate final actions. TACD supplements local consistency with explicit supervision from the frozen teacher's multi-step rollout endpoint, enabling accurate one-step action generation. Additionally, we propose Cross-Expert Wavefront Pipelining (CEWP) to eliminate unnecessary expert-level waiting. It overlaps the two experts through block-wise sharing of the video KV cache, synchronizing only immediately before the corresponding action attention consumes it. Extensive experiments across diverse benchmarks (\eg, LIBERO, LIBERO-Plus and RoboTwin) and model variants (\eg, Fast-WAM and Faster-WAM) demonstrate the superiority of RealtimeWAM. Notably, RealtimeWAM maintains near-lossless performance (\ie, <1% drop) across these benchmarks while delivering significant end-to-end speedup (\eg, sim25times on H100). Our code and checkpoints are available via this https://github.com/ModelTC/LightX2V/tree/main/examples/realtimewam{link}.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in offensive cybersecurity. In this paper, we reveal an interesting phenomenon: different agents exhibit distinct attack patterns. Specifically, each agent exhibits an attack-selection bias, disproportionately concentrating its efforts on a narrow subset of attack families regardless of prompt variations. To systematically quantify this behavior, we introduce CyBiasBench, a comprehensive 630-session benchmark that evaluates five agents on three targets and four prompt conditions with ten attack families. We identify explicit bias across agents, with different dominant attack families and varying entropy levels in their attack-family allocation distributions. Such bias is better characterized as a trait of the agents, rather than a factor associated with the attack success rate. Furthermore, our experiments reveal a bias momentum effect, where agents resist explicit steering toward attack families that conflict with their bias. This forced distribution shift does not yield measurable improvements in attack performance. To ensure reproducibility and facilitate future research, we release an interactive result dashboard at https://trustworthyai.co.kr/CyBiasBench/ and a reproducibility artifact with aggregated session-level statistics and full evaluation scripts at https://github.com/Harry24k/CyBiasBench.

World Action Models (WAMs) jointly predict future actions and the evolution of the environment. At each inference, a WAM generates a chunk of actions and the robot executes a fixed prefix before replanning. We argue that this fixed execution horizon is poorly matched to execution dynamics: the chunk reliability varies across task stages, so when to replan depends on the result of accumulated execution, not on the step counts. We propose TempoWAM (Timing Execution by Monitoring Progress Online), a lightweight plug-and-play execution scheme for WAMs. A Recurrent Progress Monitor first estimates task progress from the current observation, task instruction, remaining actions, and execution history; and an Adaptive Execution Protocol then evaluates whether the chunk is advancing the task to decide if replanning is needed. To bridge the training-deployment gap, the protocol is calibrated by a task-dependent calibration factor with online adaptation. Experiments on LIBERO, RoboTwin, and real-world tasks show that TempoWAM consistently improves the efficiency-success trade-off of WAM execution. On real robots, it reduces WAM inferences by 26.9% on easy tasks while maintaining success, and improves success by 13.3 points on difficult tasks.

World Action Models (WAMs) commonly rely on video generation to bridge visual world modeling and robot control. However, video-based WAMs face three coupled limitations: dense multi-frame future tokens make inference costly, full video prediction spends capacity on action-irrelevant temporal and appearance details, and long-horizon future imagination may introduce errors that mislead action prediction. These issues raise a simple question: Does world action model really need video generation? We propose ImageWAM, a simple WAM framework that repurposes pretrained image editing models for robot action prediction. In contrast to video generation, image editing provides a better-matched prior: it only needs to model a target-frame transformation, focuses on action-relevant current-to-target visual differences, and grounds task instructions to localized visual changes through edit pretraining. In practice, ImageWAM does not decode the target frame at inference time; instead, it conditions a flow-matching action expert on the KV caches produced by image-editing denoising, using them as a compact world-action context. ImageWAM outperforms standard VLA baselines and matching competitive WAMs without additional policy pretraining across different simulator and real-world experiments. It also reduces FLOPs to 1/6 and latency to 1/4 of video-based WAMs. Attention analysis further shows that editing caches focus on task-relevant change regions, supporting image editing as an effective alternative to video-based world-action modeling.

World Action Models (WAMs) are an emerging family of policies that tie robot action generation to future-observation modeling. In this work, we focus on the joint video--action modeling paradigm, where actions and imagined future observations are co-generated along a shared denoising or flow trajectory, so that perception, prediction, and control are coupled within one generative process. Existing WAMs typically realize this paradigm with a Mixture-of-Transformers (MoT), where video and action tokens interact through shared self-attention. This architecture can in principle assign a separate timestep t_f to each predicted latent frame, yet current systems collapse this degree of freedom onto a single shared scalar t. Under the noise-as-masking view of Diffusion Forcing, this shared schedule imposes the unjustified prior that every predicted latent is equally reliable for action generation. We instead view the per-latent schedule as a learnable information-gating policy: by changing a latent frame's noise level, the policy modulates the reliability of its Key/Value contribution to the action tokens. We propose NoiseGate, which combines independent per-latent timestep sampling during backbone training, a lightweight Gating Policy Network that emits per-latent time increments during denoising, and task-reward optimization that trains the schedule policy without hand-crafted shape priors. Built on a joint video--action MoT backbone, NoiseGate delivers consistent gains on diverse RoboTwin random-scene manipulation tasks.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

Action-conditioned world models are increasingly used as learned simulators for policy evaluation and improvement, yet their effectiveness rests on an unverified assumption: generated futures faithfully reflect arbitrary valid actions. Existing benchmarks are typically confined to expert demonstrations, leaving off-expert action following inadequately evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce WorldEcho, which probes action following over a broader action distribution using visual integrity and SE(3) trajectory alignment. Our diagnosis shows that current world models reasonably execute expert actions but struggle with diverse off-expert trajectories, either ignoring the commanded actions or producing visually invalid rollouts. We further propose WorldSync, which strengthens action following along three complementary axes: distributional coverage, representational grounding, and intervention-effect alignment. It broadens the training distribution over action consequences, grounds intermediate video representations in action-induced robot dynamics through an Action-Forcing Expert, and aligns predicted changes under action interventions with the corresponding changes in ground-truth futures. Experiments on RoboTwin benchmarks and real-robot tasks show that WorldSync improves WorldEcho metrics and serves as a more reliable simulator for iterative policy improvement, enabling policies to achieve higher success rates.

World action models (WAMs) jointly predict actions (intent) and visual future (foresight). Standard training adds noise to recorded actions and video simultaneously, but such training paradigms introduce a mismatch: perturbed actions imply counterfactual future visual, while the noised video remains tied to the GT recording. In low-noise regime, the scene geometry and even the dynamic behavior remain clearly visible from the noisy future frames despite the added noise. We present CtrlWAM, which executes perturbed actions in a simulator and pairs them with their noised visual consequences for joint WAM learning. To accommodate the different denoising requirements of video and actions, we introduce warped video--action noise schedules that aim to keep visual layout responsive as action predictions evolve. We further extend the action interface from ego-only control to a variable number of agent streams, allowing a unified model to represent predicted or commanded futures for multiple agents. Driving experiments show more accurate action forecasts, closer agreement between generated video and actions, and better following of supplied commands; robotics experiments show stronger motion fidelity and controllability. Matched controls support the benefit of off-path renders for command following and manipulation fidelity. Together, these findings contribute to a more controllable world action model. Project page: https://ctrl-wam.github.io/

This work establishes that trigger-word data poisoning of vision language action models is practical, while at the same time the open-source robotics ecosystem holds trust assumptions about community contributions. A few poisoned samples can silently embed a backdoor that disables a robot on command. We evaluate this threat against smolVLA on a real-world pick-and-place task, training on three poison ratios and evaluating across different prompts on the LeRobot platform. Three poisoned episodes in 320 clean episodes suffice for a complete denial of service. Success rate drops to 0.0 plus minus 0.0% across all trigger-word conditions and the robot locks into a fixed joint configuration rather than executing any task-relevant motion. Clean-prompt behaviour holds at approx. 50% success rate across all poison ratios, confirming the attack is stealthy under normal operation. A single poisoned episode already reduces success rate to 6.7 plus minus 6.7%. The robot still moves, but no longer completes the task. The attack generalises to front, middle, and end trigger placements despite training exclusively on front-placed triggers. These findings establish that the threat is practical, low-cost, and stealthy, and warrant treating dataset provenance as a first-class concern in open-source robotics ecosystems.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

World action models (WAMs) aim to answer a coupled physical question: given a task instruction, what motion should the robot execute, and how will that motion change the surrounding world? Most existing WAMs build on pretrained video generators and represent world evolution through images or visual latents. Robotic interaction, however, takes place in metric three-dimensional space, while images are view-dependent projections whose pixel distances do not directly encode physical distances. We introduce UNITAS, to our knowledge the first 3D-native world action model that unifies observations, actions, and scene dynamics in a shared metric 3D frame within each interaction, using a common representation across robot embodiments and human hands. Action flow represents human hands and robot grippers as 3D point trajectories, while scene flow describes scene-point displacements conditioned on these trajectories. World-aligned 3D positional embeddings ground visual tokens with or without depth input, and a physical-time trajectory tokenizer encodes each point trajectory as one token anchored at its current 3D position. This interface supports both direct action execution and action-conditioned scene prediction. With 1.7B parameters, UNITAS achieves the best action-conditioned scene prediction on RoboTwin among the compared methods, with up to 49% lower displacement errors than PointWorld, and state-of-the-art manipulation success, including 99.8% on LIBERO and an average of 85% across real-world tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/DexForce/UNITAS.

Emerging multi-robot systems rely on cooperation between humans and robots, with robots following automatically generated motion plans to service application-level tasks. Given the safety requirements associated with operating in proximity to humans and expensive infrastructure, it is important to understand and mitigate the security vulnerabilities of such systems caused by compromised robots who diverge from their assigned plans. We focus on centralized systems, where a *central entity* (CE) is responsible for determining and transmitting the motion plans to the robots, which report their location as they move following the plan. The CE checks that robots follow their assigned plans by comparing their expected location to the location they self-report. We show that this self-reporting monitoring mechanism is vulnerable to *plan-deviation attacks* where compromised robots don't follow their assigned plans while trying to conceal their movement by mis-reporting their location. We propose a two-pronged mitigation for plan-deviation attacks: (1) an attack detection technique leveraging both the robots' local sensing capabilities to report observations of other robots and *co-observation schedules* generated by the CE, and (2) a prevention technique where the CE issues *horizon-limiting announcements* to the robots, reducing their instantaneous knowledge of forward lookahead steps in the global motion plan. On a large-scale automated warehouse benchmark, we show that our solution enables attack prevention guarantees from a stealthy attacker that has compromised multiple robots.

Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) evolve continuously to evade botnet detection, posing a persistent challenge for dependable network defense. While deep learning-based detectors achieve strong performance under static conditions, they suffer severe degradation when facing temporal drift. Through a 9-year longitudinal study (2017-2025), we empirically show that state-of-the-art character- and word-based DGA classifiers rapidly lose effectiveness as new DGA variants emerge. To address this problem, we propose a drift-resilient Transformer-based framework that learns invariant representations through a hybrid tokenization strategy and multi-task self-supervised pre-training. The model integrates (i) character-level encoding to capture stochastic morphological patterns and (ii) subword-level encoding for word-based DGAs. Three pre-training tasks enable the model to learn robust structural and contextual features prior to supervised fine-tuning. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that our method significantly mitigates temporal degradation and consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in forward-chaining experiments. The proposed approach offers a dependable foundation for long-term DGA defense in evolving threat landscapes. Our code is available at: https://github.com/snsec-net/2026-DSN-DRIFT.

World-action models (WAMs) couple predictive visual modeling with action generation, typically relying on iterative denoising with a fixed denoising steps. However, manipulation tasks contain actions chunks with varying sensitivity to generation errors: critical actions require precision, while less sensitive actions allow faster generation with fewer denoising steps. Here we introduce AnyStep World Action Model, a general framework for tunable-budget prediction and scene-dependent computation allocation. Our budget-aligned teacher-trajectory distillation trains interval-conditioned flow maps using explicit frozen-teacher transitions and shared low-rank adapters, supporting action generation from one-step prediction to multi-step refinement. Building on this capability, a lightweight risk-benefit scheduler predicts teacher-curvature-based difficulty and budget-specific student-teacher fidelity from a single one-step preview, selecting the smallest budget predicted to satisfy risk-adaptive fidelity requirements. We evaluate our framework on three widely used WAMs Motus, FastWAM, and LingBotVA using RoboTwin 2.0. Our method reduces average denoising steps by 60.2%, 49.8%, and 85.28%, respectively, while maintaining baseline task success rates. In particular, our AnyStep training substantially improves model performance under a one-step denoising budget, increasing task success rates by 7.07%, 12.08%, and 8.94% on Motus, FastWAM, and LingBotVA, respectively. Experiments on six real-world manipulation tasks further validate its effectiveness.

World models, which simulate an environment and predict how it changes under actions, are increasingly used in real-world applications such as robotics. Complex systems call for the same tool because the effect of an action is not immediate. Seeding nodes for a campaign, or immunizing nodes against an epidemic, changes little on its own; what matters is the outcome that unfolds over the steps that follow. Designing an algorithm that selects such actions to maximize expected performance on a task is inherently iterative, and every candidate must be scored by the outcome it produces. Obtaining that outcome has relied on simulation, whose cost becomes a bottleneck when candidates are evaluated over many sampled trajectories. We propose an action-conditioned Network World Model that learns a network's diffusion dynamics under interventions over time, applies each action to the network, and predicts the outcome that follows. It serves as a fast evaluator inside an algorithm design loop in which a coding agent designs and refines executable algorithms using feedback from full rollouts, action-level credit, and counterfactual probes over alternative interventions. Across eight network tasks and five diffusion models, the designed algorithms match or exceed the strongest reported baseline in 138 of 141 settings while enabling up to 14.5 times faster rollouts than Monte Carlo simulation. Code will be released upon acceptance.

Diffusion-based world models have shown strong potential for unified world simulation, but the iterative denoising remains too costly for interactive use and long-horizon rollouts. While feature caching can accelerate inference without training, we find that policies designed for single-modal diffusion transfer poorly to world models due to two world-model-specific obstacles: token heterogeneity from multi-modal coupling and spatial variation, and non-uniform temporal dynamics where a small set of hard tokens drives error growth, making uniform skipping either unstable or overly conservative. We propose WorldCache, a caching framework tailored to diffusion world models. We introduce Curvature-guided Heterogeneous Token Prediction, which uses a physics-grounded curvature score to estimate token predictability and applies a Hermite-guided damped predictor for chaotic tokens with abrupt direction changes. We also design Chaotic-prioritized Adaptive Skipping, which accumulates a curvature-normalized, dimensionless drift signal and recomputes only when bottleneck tokens begin to drift. Experiments on diffusion world models show that WorldCache delivers up to 3.7times end-to-end speedups while maintaining 98\% rollout quality, demonstrating the vast advantages and practicality of WorldCache in resource-constrained scenarios. Our code is released in https://github.com/FofGofx/WorldCache.

Modern video games combine first-person perception, rapid visual changes, persistent world state, and heterogeneous native controls. Existing game agents map visual and task context directly to actions but lack explicit world dynamics modeling, whereas interactive game world models predict visual futures from supplied actions but do not serve as task policies. World-Action Models (WAMs) unify these objectives, but remain largely unexplored under the dynamics and open-ended interaction of video games. We introduce GameWAM, to our knowledge the first WAM for native closed-loop gameplay and GUI control. GameWAM jointly generates future visual observations and executable keyboard-mouse trajectories through parallel visual and action generative processes with block-causal conditioning and flow matching. To support joint world-action learning, we construct synchronized gameplay and GUI trajectories. To handle heterogeneous native control, GameWAM predicts a gameplay/GUI mode at each action step and generates actions with mode-specific prediction distributions and continuous-action normalization. For long-horizon interaction, block-cycle control predicts beyond the committed horizon, executes only a short action prefix, and replans from new observations, while fine-grained within-cycle context and hierarchical cross-cycle history preserve temporal continuity. Experiments demonstrate competitive task success with fewer executed native actions than the compared agents. We further uncover Low-Frequency Action Source Imprinting (LASI), in which low-frequency components of the sampled action source systematically steer coarse generated camera motion under fixed conditioning, revealing a source-sensitivity failure mode in generative control. Project page is available at https://yunncheng.github.io/GameWAM/.

Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not. We argue that this binary attack-success rate discards the information a defender most needs, namely how harmful the resulting action was. We introduce an action-graded harm rubric that scores an agent's tool-call trajectory on a seven-level ordinal scale (L0 to L6) according to whether the executed action was reversible, whether it crossed scope to reach another party, and whether it expanded privilege. We compute the scale two ways: a deterministic oracle that reads the trajectory and the attacker's stated goal, and a panel of three frontier language-model judges that read a tag-free account of the same trajectory. Across four victim models and two defenses on the AgentDojo workspace suite, severity grading exposes three cases the binary metric hides, including a defense that reports a zero attack-success rate while still permitting an externally visible cross-scope leak through an unfiltered tool. The judge panel reproduces the oracle with high ordinal agreement (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.91) but shares systematic blind spots that we characterize, most notably a failure to recognize escalation chains. Unlike prior work that provides harm taxonomies, harmful-task completion tests, execution-level safety benchmarks, or severity-aware simulation, our contribution is a reusable, trace-grounded severity instrument applied to the actual actions recorded in existing red-team logs. All code, prompts, and per-episode logs are released.

Black-box adversarial attacks that minimize only the ground-truth confidence suffer from class drift: perturbations wander through the feature space without committing to a specific adversarial class, wasting queries on diffuse, undirected progress. We introduce Opportunistic Target Selection (OTS), a lightweight wrapper that switches an untargeted attack to a targeted objective early in its trajectory, locking onto whichever non-true class currently leads. OTS requires no architectural modification to the underlying attack, no gradient access, and no a priori target-class knowledge. We validate OTS on three score-based attacks (SimBA, Square Attack with cross-entropy loss, and Bandits) across five standard ImageNet classifiers (4,500 runs). On random-search attacks, OTS closely tracks oracle performance, with gains up to +27 pp in success rate and 43% relative reduction in censored-mean iterations on ResNet-50. On gradient-estimation attacks (Bandits) and attacks with margin loss, OTS is redundant, a negative result that reinforces our interpretation of OTS as a margin-loss surrogate. On adversarially-trained models, a bimodal difficulty distribution eliminates the regime where targeting helps.

World-Action Models (WAMs) improve robotic manipulation by conditioning action generation on predicted future observations, but future prediction adds further inference overhead to already expensive iterative action generation. Action chunking can amortize this cost over multiple actions, yet performance degrades over long execution horizons because later actions remain conditioned on stale observations. We introduce STAIRCASE POLICY, a streaming inference and training framework that turns a flow-matching VLA into a JEPA-style WAM and partitions a large action chunk into sub-chunks at staggered denoising stages. Near-term actions are executed as soon as they become available, while later actions continue to be refined. At each sub-chunk boundary, the future latent is re-predicted from the latest observation and used to update all unexecuted actions, enabling long-horizon execution without repeated full policy inference. The resulting future-prediction error can further serve as a signal for adaptive chunking. S-WAM achieves 97.7% on LIBERO and 87.9% on LIBERO-Plus, and improves performance across multiple policy backbones and real-robot tasks. It reaches 292.7 executed actions per second, 3.62times the throughput of conventional execution at comparable accuracy, while reducing time-to-first-action from 123.6 to 73.3 ms. With additional inference optimizations, throughput further increases to 642.9 actions per second.

Recent world-action models (WAMs) show that co-training policies with future prediction can provide physical priors for action generation. Building on the future-prediction ability of video models, many WAMs generate future videos and recover actions with inverse-dynamics models, or use these predicted videos as goal conditions for action generation. In both cases, the world model is trained mostly on successful demonstrations and has little reason to predict the consequences of bad actions. We introduce FACT, a causal World-Action Model that predicts future video and task progress conditioned on the executed action. This action-conditioned interface allows failure rollouts to supervise action consequences, turning bad actions into valid future targets rather than being discarded. Failure-aware training makes the progress predictor aware of both successful and failed action outcomes, which can optionally be used to score sampled action candidates at inference. Extensive experiments on simulation and real-world bimanual manipulation tasks show that FACT outperforms many existing baselines, improves as failure data are incorporated into training, and reduces success-biased future hallucination under bad actions. See more details at https://fact-wam.github.io/

World action models (WAMs) have emerged as a promising paradigm for robotic control by jointly predicting future visual dynamics and actions from an initial observation and instruction. However, existing WAMs struggle with long-horizon prediction, as generating dense video rollouts is highly inefficient. Some recent WAMs address this by predicting a single future frame without generating the full video, but this approach neglects how to progress toward the goal. We present ProWAM, a progressive world action model that jointly predicts actions and an ordered sequence of sparse visual sub-goals, providing explicit visual guidance to anchor action generation throughout task execution. This design scales naturally, as sub-goal prediction can be learned from large-scale action-free videos, allowing the video backbone to offload complex visual planning from the action policy. For efficient action generation, ProWAM executes a single video-backbone forward pass to cache sparse sub-goal features, eliminating iterative full-video generation and requiring only lightweight action denoising during replanning. Across extensive evaluations, ProWAM achieves superior out-of-distribution robustness. On simulation benchmarks, it sets new state-of-the-art results on LIBERO-Plus (85.8%) and randomized RoboTwin (75.7%), outperforming the strongest baseline with relative gains of up to +35.9%. On RoboCasa365, ProWAM achieves a 48.1% success rate and 18.2% on the challenging Composite-Unseen split, ranking 4th overall. Crucially, in zero-shot real-world experiments, ProWAM achieves 70.0% success, outperforming the strongest baseline by +15.0 (from 55.0% to 70.0%, a +27.3% relative gain) in novel scenes. These results demonstrate the value of progress-indexed visual foresight for closed-loop control. Our program is in https://sii-ferenas.github.io/ProWAM-page.

World Action Models (WAMs) have emerged as a promising alternative for embodied intelligence by jointly predicting future world states and robot actions. However, their heavy visual encoding and iterative generative inference incur substantial latency, limiting their applicability to high-frequency closed-loop control. Existing training-free acceleration methods typically optimize a single stage, yielding limited speedups or degraded control under aggressive reuse. In this work, we systematically profile the inference overhead of WAMs and observe abundant redundancy across Transformer computation, diffusion denoising, and consecutive policy queries. However, the safe removal of such redundancy depends strongly on its impact on action prediction and control sensitivity. Based on these observations, we introduce MARS, a training-free and plug-and-play framework for multi-level WAM acceleration. MARS selectively removes low-impact attention computation, adaptively accelerates diffusion inference according to motion granularity, and speculatively reuses predicted future visual representations across consecutive queries with online verification. Together, these complementary mechanisms provide remarkable acceleration while limiting approximation error. Extensive experiments across LIBERO, LIBERO-PRO, and RoboCasa show that MARS achieves up to 4.00times, 3.94times, and 2.10times end-to-end speedups, respectively, while maintaining task success rate close to the original policy. Moreover, MARS generalizes across different model backbones and across simulation and real-robot experiments, substantially improving the efficiency--performance trade-off of WAM inference. Our code is available at https://github.com/PKU-VaLuE-Lab/MARS.

The transition from stateless generative models in artificial intelligence to stateful, autonomous agents represents an architectural evolution that, while providing the capabilities of long-term planning and the automation of enterprise workflows, also represents the introduction of a new form of security threat, the Chronos Vulnerability. The Chronos Vulnerability represents the threat of memory-based attacks, including the Memory Injection Attack (MINJA) and the sleeper agent, in which the internal belief system of the autonomous agent is compromised, effectively decoupling the attack vector from the final catastrophic event. This study formalizes the threat model for persistence-based attacks and the threat of Dynamics Blindness in the context of the World of Workflows benchmark, demonstrating that traditional endpoint content filters are insufficient for the current stateful architecture. Consequently, this study synthesizes a defense-in-depth landscape, categorizing emerging frameworks such as diagnostic trajectory guardrails (AgentDoG), formal temporal verification (Agent-C), immunological memory consensus (A-MemGuard), and hardware-anchored trust via GPU-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Zero-Trust memory architectures.

World Action Models (WAMs) enable semantically- and physically-informed control but are brittle under distribution shift. In this work, we use mechanistic interpretability to study how robustness-relevant perturbations are represented in WAM activation space. Comparing activations across successful and unsuccessful rollouts, we find some WAM architectures exhibit low-dimensional linear separability for robustness-critical features, while others do not. This motivates the use of contrastive activation directions for training-free WAM steering. We also show that local linearity in WAM activation dynamics enables efficient feedback steering via model-based optimal control, yielding World-Action Linear Quadratic Regulator (WA-LQR), a minimally-invasive reduced-order LQR controller. Via mechanistic evaluations, we predict strong steerability in the Cosmos-Policy and DiT4DiT models but weak steerability in LingBot-VA, consistent with steering intervention results. On Cosmos-Policy and DiT4DiT, WA-LQR generalizes contrastive directions to new tasks and improves robustness to camera, gripper, and visual-noise perturbations over unsteered and prompt steering baselines.

Water looks unchanged as it warms, then at a critical point it boils. We ask whether long-horizon language agents show an analogous transition in their implicit world models. In some parameter settings, changing state load by a small amount, or adding a single step of horizon, leaves behavior nearly unchanged; near a critical boundary, the same small change causes a sudden world collapse. We study this effect in a deterministic task family with exact per-step gold state. A large grid search over state cardinality, dependency density, horizon, branching, observation mode, and mutation rate reveals a phase diagram: a solved plateau, a narrow transition band, and a collapse floor. Per-step traces show the mechanism: world-state fidelity fails before action validity, so the agent is not merely choosing a bad action; it is acting from a corrupted world. Stronger models translate the critical boundary but do not remove the qualitative transition. These results make world-model collapse a measurable bottleneck for long-horizon agents.

Recent advances in robot foundation models trained on large-scale human teleoperation data have enabled robots to perform increasingly complex real-world tasks. However, scaling these systems remains difficult because collecting task-specific demonstrations is expensive and labor-intensive. Synthetic data, especially generated videos, offer a promising direction, but existing World Models (WMs) are not directly suitable for policy learning since they do not provide paired action trajectories. World-Action (WA) models partially address this by predicting actions with visual outputs, yet often lack strong video-action alignment, while two-stage pipelines that generate video first and then infer actions introduce inefficiency and error accumulation. To address these limitations, we propose VAG, a unified flow-matching-based dual-stream framework that jointly generates video and action under visual and language conditioning. By synchronizing denoising in both branches and using an adaptive 3D pooling mechanism to transfer compact global video context to the action branch, VAG improves cross-modal consistency during generation. Across both simulated and real-world settings, VAG produces aligned video-action pairs with competitive prediction quality, supports executable trajectory replay, and provides useful synthetic pretraining data that improves downstream policy generalization, indicating its potential as a practical world-action model for embodied data synthesis.

World Action Models (WAMs) have recently emerged as a promising paradigm for robotic manipulation by jointly predicting future visual observations and future actions. However, current WAMs typically execute a fixed number of predicted actions after each model inference, leaving the robot blind to whether the imagined future remains consistent with the actual physical rollout. In this work, we formulate adaptive WAM execution as a future-reality verification problem: the robot should execute longer when the WAM-predicted future remains reliable, and replan earlier when reality deviates from imagination. To this end, we propose Future Forward Dynamics Causal Attention (FFDC), a lightweight verifier that jointly reasons over predicted future actions, predicted visual dynamics, real observations, and language instructions to estimate whether the remaining action rollout can still be trusted. FFDC enables adaptive action chunk sizes as an emergent consequence of prediction-observation consistency, preserving the efficiency of long-horizon execution while restoring responsiveness in contact-rich or difficult phases. We further introduce Mixture-of-Horizon Training to improve long-horizon trajectory coverage for adaptive execution. Experiments on the RoboTwin benchmark and in the real world demonstrate that our method achieves a strong robustness-efficiency trade-off: on RoboTwin, it reduces WAM forward passes by 69.10% and execution time by 34.02%, while improving success rate by 2.54% over the short-chunk baseline; in real-world experiments, it improves success rate by 35%.

Interactive game world models typically autoregress visual observations directly in pixel or latent space, forcing structured properties such as pose, geometry, and occlusion to be implicitly maintained by the same generative sequence. Over long horizons, errors in these latent world properties accumulate, making consistency and controllability fragile. We explicitly model the evolving world state, delegate exact geometric computation to a fixed, zero-parameter renderer, and leave the neural model to synthesize appearance. We instantiate this idea as Marionette, a world model for interactive games with articulated characters. First, a two-stage autoregressive dynamics model predicts an explicit and interpretable 276-dimensional 3D world state comprising multi-entity articulated skeletons, metric root trajectories, and rotations. Second, a zero-parameter graphics bridge converts the predicted state into pose-control videos, computing world-space geometry and occlusion in closed form. Third, a control-conditioned video-diffusion observation model synthesizes photorealistic RGB observations from the resulting structured controls. Our experiments establish two properties of Marionette. First, the predicted world state is directly controllable. Forcing a mismatched action stream changes root-aligned joint error by 31% across 48 held-out segments. Second, long-horizon behaviour is determined in the state, and can be repaired there. Left free, the two generated characters drift to 21.2 m apart (recorded sessions stay near 5 m) and a third of frames show ground penetration. Two rules imposed on the explicit state, a terrain collider and a separation cap, cut penetration by 66% and keep the pair engaged, with no change to the observation model. Routing appearance through the predicted state costs no fidelity we can detect, at an FVD of 831 against 799 for recorded pose.

LLM-based agents process external content, exposing them to prompt injection and multi-turn manipulation. Most safety benchmarks evaluate defenders against fixed attack pools collected before evaluation, single-turn or multi-turn. We present a 21-scenario benchmark for adaptive multi-round attacks against memoryless LLM defenders: an autonomous LLM attacker observes prior defender responses and pivots across rounds, while each defender response is evaluated as a fresh interaction. Holding the 21 scenarios, attackers, defenders, and structured-output scoring fixed, restricting scoring to the first attacker turn yields 0-1% attack success rate (ASR); allowing 15 rounds of adaptive attack yields 5.4-14.0%. Pooling three frontier attacker LLMs uncovers 1.4-2.2times as many unique successful attacks as the best single attacker, and the generated attacks have low cosine similarity (0.02-0.14) to attacks in existing benchmarks. Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4 are tied in aggregate (5.4% each; overlapping 95% CIs), but their weaknesses differ sharply: on one scenario Opus reaches 60% ASR (95% CI 36--80%) while GPT-5.4 and Gemini each stay at 7% (CI 1-30%; the gap is preserved in a higher-N replication). 13 of 21 scenarios distinguish at least one defender pair, yet rankings disagree across scenarios (Kendall's W = 0.19). We release the benchmark -- 21 evaluation scenarios, 10 public development scenarios, the orchestrator, baseline harnesses, and a multi-attacker CLI -- plus 945 transcripts from the 3times3 frontier matrix, an attack-replay dataset, and 18{,}422 gpt-oss-20b battles from an open competition's final scoring rounds.

We show that Web and Research Agents (WRAs) -- language model-based systems that investigate complex topics on the Internet -- are vulnerable to inference attacks by passive network adversaries such as ISPs. These agents could be deployed locally by organizations and individuals for privacy, legal, or financial purposes. Unlike sporadic web browsing by humans, WRAs visit 70{-}140 domains with distinguishable timing correlations, enabling unique fingerprinting attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate a novel prompt and user trait leakage attack against WRAs that only leverages their network-level metadata (i.e., visited IP addresses and their timings). We start by building a new dataset of WRA traces based on user search queries and queries generated by synthetic personas. We define a behavioral metric (called OBELS) to comprehensively assess similarity between original and inferred prompts, showing that our attack recovers over 73% of the functional and domain knowledge of user prompts. Extending to a multi-session setting, we recover up to 19 of 32 latent traits with high accuracy. Our attack remains effective under partial observability and noisy conditions. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies that constrain domain diversity or obfuscate traces, showing negligible utility impact while reducing attack effectiveness by an average of 29%.

Most existing LLM safety evaluation and defense methods follow a static formulation: jailbreak vulnerabilities are evaluated with fixed attack methods, and guardrails are trained on fixed malicious prompt datasets. However, real-world adversaries continuously evolve their capabilities and expand the attack space. To address this challenge, we propose DARWIN, an evolutionary attack-defense framework that formulates jailbreaking as an open-ended evolution process and continuously updates guardrails through an evolving attack-defense loop. DARWIN-Attack is an evolutionary adversary that expands its capabilities through strategy discovery, mutation, selection, and feedback-driven composition. It collects strategies from broad external sources, generates new variants through self-reflection and genetic evolution, and retains effective strategies based on their performance against aligned LLMs. During attack execution, DARWIN-Attack adaptively selects and combines evolved strategies according to feedback from target LLMs and guardrails. Across frontier models and guardrails, it achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates, including nearly 100% on DeepSeek-V4-Pro and YuFeng-XGuard and over 90% on GPT-5.5. On the defense side, we introduce DARWIN-Guard, an online adversarial training paradigm that iteratively learns from emerging adversarial samples generated by DARWIN-Attack. To improve robustness without sacrificing utility, DARWIN-Guard jointly trains on malicious and benign disguised queries, encouraging the model to identify underlying intent rather than superficial attack patterns. DARWIN-Guard achieves an average unsafe recall of 91.6% across 12 safety benchmarks, outperforming strong guardrails such as YuFeng-XGuard and Nemotron Guard, while maintaining a nearly 100% pass rate on standard benign datasets.

We present ABot-World-0, an action-conditioned video world model for real-time, long-horizon closed-loop interaction, supported by a multi-source data infrastructure spanning AAA games, simulation engines, and internet videos to learn controllable world dynamics. WorldExplorer performs agent-driven collection guided by training feedback, while a unified pipeline applies 14 deterministic quality checks, VLM-based assessment, and synchronized action and text annotation. We progressively distill a bidirectional action-conditioned teacher into a causal student through teacher forcing and ODE distillation, and introduce LongForcing to align long student self-rollouts with an extended-horizon teacher, mitigating accumulated distribution shift and autoregressive drift. Raw keyboard actions provide a unified control interface for scene roaming and third-person character interaction, while reference-character memory provides persistent appearance cues for identity consistency during third-person rollouts. For deployment, we co-design a streaming inference stack with a lightweight VAE decoder, efficient attention, memory-aware scheduling, and low-bit DiT inference. Across optimized low-bit configurations, ABot-World-0 streams 720P video at up to 16 FPS on a single NVIDIA RTX 5090 desktop GPU, with 1.2s action-to-first-frame latency and approximately 19GiB peak VRAM. Experiments on WorldRoamBench and extended interactive rollouts demonstrate competitive controllability and coherent long-horizon world evolution.

Human pose estimation and keypoint-based action recognition models are increasingly deployed as components of video understanding pipelines, yet their vulnerability to adversarial attacks remains insufficiently studied. Temporally coherent black-box attacks have been previously studied in visual object tracking, where the attack feedback can be defined using bounding-box overlap measures such as Intersection over Union (IoU). However, human pose estimation produces keypoint configurations rather than enclosing boxes, making box-level similarity poorly suited for measuring pose degradation. We propose OKS Attack, a decision-based black-box attack that uses Object Keypoint Similarity (OKS) as the attack feedback signal, directly targeting the spatial structure of human poses rather than their enclosing boxes. Experiments on the Penn Action dataset show that OKS Attack consistently reduces pose quality across evaluated pose estimators, with mean OKS decreases ranging from 0.0802 to 0.1494. In a downstream cross-dataset action-recognition evaluation, the attack reduces accuracy by 6.18 to 13.86 percentage points and outperforms query-matched random-noise perturbations. The attack is effective across both top-down and single-stage pose estimation models. The source code will be made publicly available at https://github.com/KacperM33/OKS_attack

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to sustained interaction with files, terminals, browsers, and external tools. This shift creates safety risks that are difficult to detect from isolated prompts or final responses, because harm often emerges only through multi-step execution traces whose individual actions appear locally benign. We introduce BraveGuard, a self-evolving defense framework for training guard models from open-world threat signals and realistic agent trajectories. BraveGuard mines recent research sources to identify emerging risks and attack patterns, instantiates them as executable computer-use tasks, collects agent rollouts, and derives trajectory-level supervision for guard model training. As new threats and validation failures appear, the pipeline can be repeated, yielding an adaptive defense loop rather than a static, benchmark-driven training process. We instantiate BraveGuard by training multiple guard backbones, including Qwen3-Guard and Llama-Guard variants, and evaluate the resulting guards on trajectory-level agent-safety benchmarks. BraveGuard consistently improves safety detection across computer-use trajectories. On AgentHazard, it substantially improves detection accuracy over off-the-shelf guard models, with accuracy increasing from 38.79% to 82.38% under the averaged guard-model setting. These results show that guard supervision grounded in open-world threat discovery and realistic agent execution can improve safety monitoring beyond fixed taxonomies and synthetic prompt-level data. BraveGuard offers a scalable path toward adaptive defenses for computer-use agents facing evolving real-world risks.

World models in robot learning predict future states from visual observations and actions, enabling agents to reason about the consequences of their controls. However, many action-conditioned models are evaluated in settings where motion is dominated by immediate control, whereas aquatic surface vehicles and other real-world objects continue moving under inertia and are displaced by hidden ambient drift, such as water currents or wind. We propose FlowMo-WM, an end-to-end trainable visual world model that infers object-centric motion state and a predictive long-history context associated with hidden drift from image-action histories without direct supervision of flow fields. FlowMo-WM factorizes image-action history into a short-history latent state, trained to summarize object-centric motion, and a longer-history context, trained to summarize slowly varying exogenous influences. A zero-context residual transition separates action-conditioned base dynamics from context-dependent drift effects during latent rollout. In simulated aquatic surface-vehicle environments with diverse hidden flows, disturbances, and randomized vehicle dynamics, FlowMo-WM improves long-horizon rollout accuracy over representative action-conditioned latent world models. Prediction-time context ablations, in which the inferred context is zeroed or shuffled during rollout, show that the ambient context is important for stable prediction under hidden drift, while frozen linear probes characterize information encoded in the learned factors.

We introduce a red-teaming methodology that exposes harder-to-catch attacks for coding-agent monitors, suggesting that current practices may under-elicit attacks and overstate monitor performance. We identify three challenges with current red-teaming. First, mode collapse in attack generation, which we reduce with a novel attack taxonomy for broader coverage. Second, a conceive-execute gap: frontier LLMs can propose strong attack ideas or execute them, but not all at once. We mitigate this by decomposing attack construction into strategy generation, execution, and post-hoc trajectory refinement. Third, manual elicitation is costly to scale, which we address with our semi-automated red-teaming pipeline. Applied to BashArena, an AI control setting for tool-using coding agents, this pipeline produces MonitoringBench, a benchmark of 2,644 attack trajectories for evaluating monitor capabilities and failure modes. Our pipeline produces more diverse and stronger attacks: Opus-4.5 monitor's catch rate falls from 94.9\% on elicited-only Opus attacks to 60.3\% on our best refined attacks, with larger drops for several mid-tier monitors. Attacks optimized against three development monitors generalize to ten held-out monitors, with catch rates generally increasing with monitor capability. Using this benchmark, we provide a snapshot of the current monitor capabilities and find that frontier monitors often detect suspicious actions but fall for persuasion or fail to calibrate suspiciousness scores appropriately, suggesting tractable paths for improvement. MonitoringBench provides both a static benchmark for current tool-use monitors and a reusable methodology for refreshing these evaluations as agents and monitors improve.

As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly automate complex web tasks, they boost productivity while simultaneously introducing new security risks. However, relevant studies on web agent attacks remain limited. Existing red-teaming approaches mainly rely on manually crafted attack strategies or static models trained offline. Such methods fail to capture the underlying behavioral patterns of web agents, making it difficult to generalize across diverse environments. In web agent attacks, success requires the continuous discovery and evolution of attack strategies. To this end, we propose Genesis, a novel agentic framework composed of three modules: Attacker, Scorer, and Strategist. The Attacker generates adversarial injections by integrating the genetic algorithm with a hybrid strategy representation. The Scorer evaluates the target web agent's responses to provide feedback. The Strategist dynamically uncovers effective strategies from interaction logs and compiles them into a continuously growing strategy library, which is then re-deployed to enhance the Attacker's effectiveness. Extensive experiments across various web tasks show that our framework discovers novel strategies and consistently outperforms existing attack baselines.

World-action models (WAMs) transfer visual and motion priors from pretrained video generators to robot control by jointly modeling visual dynamics and actions. Existing WAMs, however, predict dense future frames during training, repeatedly modeling largely unchanged content and coupling action-conditioned dynamics to nuisance appearance variations. At inference, processing each complete observation with the heavy video expert bottlenecks few-step action generation. Accordingly, we propose DeltaWAM, which jointly predicts visual deltas and actions using dense-anchor, sparse-delta, and action streams, with three architectures that differ in representation and computation sharing. We further develop Streaming Delta Memory (SDM), which updates cached anchor context with compact observed deltas, reducing heavy video-expert processing. On RoboTwin, DeltaWAM with SDM improves average success over Fast-WAM from 81.3% to 85.4% in the clean setting and from 75.8% to 83.9% under visual randomization. The three architectures reduce training FLOPs by 17.78-23.77%, while SDM reduces one-step inference latency and FLOPs by 36.57% and 31.55%, respectively; real-world evaluations further show the highest overall success rate and normalized progress among the evaluated policies. Code: https://github.com/AIGeeksGroup/DeltaWAM. Website: https://aigeeksgroup.github.io/DeltaWAM.

Improving robot policies on new tasks without collecting additional expert demonstrations remains a central challenge in robot learning. World action models (WAMs) use broad video priors to jointly predict future videos and actions, offering a potential source of supervision for adapting to new tasks. However, generated videos may fail to depict task completion, and even visually successful videos may be paired with inconsistent actions that lead to execution failure. We propose EVO-WAM, a framework that adapts WAMs to unseen tasks by learning from their own generated video-action trajectories, without executing candidate actions in an external environment. First, we augment WAM training with state prediction and anchored multi-frame context to enable complete autoregressive rollouts without external execution feedback. Second, we identify reliable training experience by selecting task-completing prefixes with a vision-language model and verifying their video-action consistency with an inverse dynamics model. Third, we iteratively train the WAM on verified prefixes and generate new rollouts with the updated model. On seven unseen RoboTwin 2.0 tasks, EVO-WAM increases average success rates from 26.9% to 68.0% for Cosmos3 and from 28.5% to 46.4% for DreamZero, reaching approximately 2.5times and 1.6times their initial success rates. On three unseen long-horizon composite tasks in the real world, it improves Cosmos3's average success rate from 20.0% to 76.7%, a gain of 56.7 percentage points. Project Page: https://evo-wam.github.io/.

As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person. We argue the gate is the easy part; the hard part is the judgment - which actions to stop - which the field evaluates against two false assumptions: that there is a ground-truth notion of "risky," and that the human reviewer is a perfect, infinitely-available oracle. On a hand-labeled set of 125 adversarially-weighted agent actions we show that (i) reviewers only moderately agree on what is risky (Fleiss' kappa = 0.52), so there is no single correct label; (ii) framing the guard as selective classification under asymmetric cost makes its operating limits measurable, and on hard inputs the guard cannot safely auto-decide; and (iii) when the reviewer is modeled as endogenous (fatiguing as escalation load grows), realized safety becomes an inverted-U in the escalation rate: more human oversight can make a system less safe, and the safety-optimal guard escalates below full escalation - a setting a load-aware policy also uses to resist a flooding attack that slips a malicious action past a fatigued reviewer. Agent oversight, framed this way, is not only a classification problem but a resource-allocation one: human attention is finite, and the guard's escalation policy spends it. We claim none of these mechanisms as novel - fatigue-aware learning-to-defer (FALCON), cost-sensitive deferral under workload constraints (DeCCaF), trajectory-level guarding, and reviewer-fatigue/flooding attacks are all prior art we cite. Our contribution is an open-source agent-oversight system that operationalizes and measures them in the LLM-agent action-gating setting, turning "is my guard good?" from a guess into a curve. The inverted-U and the flooding attack are modeling results that motivate a human study.

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce CLAWSAFETY, a benchmark of 120 adversarial test scenarios organized along three dimensions (harm domain, attack vector, and harmful action type) and grounded in realistic, high-privilege professional workspaces spanning software engineering, finance, healthcare, law, and DevOps. Each test case embeds adversarial content in one of three channels the agent encounters during normal work: workspace skill files, emails from trusted senders, and web pages. We evaluate five frontier LLMs as agent backbones, running 2,520 sandboxed trials across all configurations. Attack success rates (ASR) range from 40\% to 75\% across models and vary sharply by injection vector, with skill instructions (highest trust) consistently more dangerous than email or web content. Action-trace analysis reveals that the strongest model maintains hard boundaries against credential forwarding and destructive actions, while weaker models permit both. Cross-scaffold experiments on three agent frameworks further demonstrate that safety is not determined by the backbone model alone but depends on the full deployment stack, calling for safety evaluation that treats model and framework as joint variables. Code and data will be available at: https://weibowen555.github.io/ClawSafety/.

Evaluation and alignment pipelines for large language models increasingly rely on LLM-based judges, whose behavior is guided by natural-language rubrics and validated on benchmarks. We identify a previously under-recognized vulnerability in this workflow, which we term Rubric-Induced Preference Drift (RIPD). Even when rubric edits pass benchmark validation, they can still produce systematic and directional shifts in a judge's preferences on target domains. Because rubrics serve as a high-level decision interface, such drift can emerge from seemingly natural, criterion-preserving edits and remain difficult to detect through aggregate benchmark metrics or limited spot-checking. We further show this vulnerability can be exploited through rubric-based preference attacks, in which benchmark-compliant rubric edits steer judgments away from a fixed human or trusted reference on target domains, systematically inducing RIPD and reducing target-domain accuracy up to 9.5% (helpfulness) and 27.9% (harmlessness). When these judgments are used to generate preference labels for downstream post-training, the induced bias propagates through alignment pipelines and becomes internalized in trained policies. This leads to persistent and systematic drift in model behavior. Overall, our findings highlight evaluation rubrics as a sensitive and manipulable control interface, revealing a system-level alignment risk that extends beyond evaluator reliability alone. The code is available at: https://github.com/ZDCSlab/Rubrics-as-an-Attack-Surface. Warning: Certain sections may contain potentially harmful content that may not be appropriate for all readers.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

World Action Models (WAMs) improve robot policy learning by jointly modeling actions and future visual observations, using future scene evolution as dense supervision for physically grounded action generation. However, a common design in existing WAMs is to explicitly generate future videos at inference time, incurring substantial computational overhead and hindering real-time closed-loop deployment. GigaWorld-Policy addresses this issue with an action-centered formulation, where future visual dynamics are used during training while action-only decoding is used at inference time. Building upon this framework, we present GigaWorld-Policy-0.5, an enhanced action-centered WAM designed for more efficient robot control. During pretraining, GigaWorld-Policy-0.5 adopts a mixed Action-Conditioned World Modeling (AC-WM) and WAM training strategy. This strengthens the coupling between visual dynamics and robot actions and improves the transferability of action representations for downstream policy learning. For efficient inference, GigaWorld-Policy-0.5 introduces a Mixture-of-Transformers architecture that separates visual dynamics modeling and action generation into specialized experts, reducing active computation during action-only inference and achieving 85 ms inference latency on a local RTX 4090 setup. In addition, we employ an agent-based AutoResearch pipeline to systematically search training configurations, enabling more efficient identification of optimal experimental setups while reducing the time and manual intervention required for hyperparameter tuning. Experiments and ablations show that GigaWorld-Policy-0.5 preserves the training benefits of future visual dynamics while improving inference efficiency for robot control.

World Action Models (WAMs) leverage the capabilities of large-scale pretrained video diffusion models to jointly predict future observations and actions, inheriting rich visual and physical priors from internet-scale video. This has made them a promising paradigm for robot policy learning, yet the prevailing models operate exclusively on RGB observations and do not leverage 3D information. To bridge this gap, we introduce a Spatially Aware World Action Model (SA-WAM), which repurposes a pretrained video model for joint action, RGB, and depth prediction, enabling 3D-aware world modeling and action prediction within a single diffusion backbone. We use a nonlinear encoding that maps the unbounded depth signal into the bounded input domain expected by the frozen VAE tokenizer. This allows us to reuse the tokenizer without 3D-specific fine-tuning, incorporating geometric information without sacrificing the pretrained priors. SA-WAM achieves state-of-the-art results on the RoboCasa and LIBERO-Plus benchmarks, while simultaneously improving future-state predictions. Furthermore, SA-WAM outperforms strong baselines in real-world evaluation using a UR5 robotic arm, with strong gains in randomized environments. We analyze the correlation between world model prediction quality and rollout success, providing insights into WAM performance and avenues for its improvement.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw ecosystem. We systematically investigate its current threat landscape, highlighting critical vulnerabilities such as prompt injection-driven Remote Code Execution (RCE), sequential tool attack chains, context amnesia, and supply chain contamination. To systematically contextualize these threats, we propose a novel tri-layered risk taxonomy for autonomous Agents, categorizing vulnerabilities across AI Cognitive, Software Execution, and Information System dimensions. To address these systemic architectural flaws, we introduce the Full-Lifecycle Agent Security Architecture (FASA). This theoretical defense blueprint advocates for zero-trust agentic execution, dynamic intent verification, and cross-layer reasoning-action correlation. Building on this framework, we present Project ClawGuard, our ongoing engineering initiative. This project aims to implement the FASA paradigm and transition autonomous agents from high-risk experimental utilities into trustworthy systems. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/NY1024/ClawGuard.

World Action Models (WAM) improve robot policies by augmenting sparse action supervision with dense future prediction. However, much of the predictable future is dominated by appearance and scene persistence rather than action-dependent dynamics. We observe that several recent WAM designs, including optical flow, motion-centric representations, and latent actions, can be understood from a common perspective in which world supervision becomes more efficient as it contains a higher proportion of action-relevant variation. Based on this insight, we introduce Action Tangent Fields, which reformulate world supervision through a local Taylor expansion of how actions induce changes in future dynamics. We represent future dynamics in Residual-VAE space, where the future latent remains recoverable from the current latent and its residual, and use a strong action-conditioned world model (ACWM) to probe the local correspondence between action variations and residual-world variations. This local first-order structure is distilled into the WAM to guide its denoising supervision toward dynamics that are more tightly coupled to action, rather than merely predictable from appearance. Across LIBERO-Plus, RoboTwin, and RoboTwin2.0-Plus, our method consistently improves robustness to lighting, background, camera, layout, and other environmental perturbations. Despite using no large-scale embodied pretraining, it achieves stronger robustness under several distribution shifts than pretrained policies. We further distill multi-step VideoDiT denoising into a single step for efficient inference. Our results suggest that effective WAM supervision should remain information-rich while concentrating its predictive capacity on the directions along which actions change the future.

Current adversarial attacks on motion estimation, or optical flow, optimize small per-pixel perturbations, which are unlikely to appear in the real world. In contrast, adverse weather conditions constitute a much more realistic threat scenario. Hence, in this work, we present a novel attack on motion estimation that exploits adversarially optimized particles to mimic weather effects like snowflakes, rain streaks or fog clouds. At the core of our attack framework is a differentiable particle rendering system that integrates particles (i) consistently over multiple time steps (ii) into the 3D space (iii) with a photo-realistic appearance. Through optimization, we obtain adversarial weather that significantly impacts the motion estimation. Surprisingly, methods that previously showed good robustness towards small per-pixel perturbations are particularly vulnerable to adversarial weather. At the same time, augmenting the training with non-optimized weather increases a method's robustness towards weather effects and improves generalizability at almost no additional cost. Our code will be available at https://github.com/cv-stuttgart/DistractingDownpour.

World-action models (WAMs) jointly generate future video and robot actions through iterative diffusion, achieving strong performance on manipulation benchmarks but requiring tens of denoising steps, a cost that precludes real-time control. Step distillation has emerged as the natural remedy, but off-the-shelf methods break down in the joint video-action setting because video and action streams use different SNR-shifted noise schedules and reach training with substantially different marginal noise distributions, an asymmetry that single-modality distillation methods cannot accommodate. We introduce Flash-WAM, a modality-aware step-distillation framework inspired by consistency distillation that selects the consistency function for each modality to match its noise regime: a linear-gradient-scaling parametrization for the action stream's low-noise regime, paired with a variance-preserving parametrization for the video stream's high-noise regime, grounded in a structural analysis of the consistency-function family that characterizes the achievable gradient scaling under the consistency boundary condition. Instantiated on LingBot-VA, Flash-WAM compresses inference to a single step in each modality. On RoboTwin 2.0, this reduces per-chunk latency from 8.1 seconds to 348 ms on NVIDIA L40S, a 23{times} speedup that enables real-time inference. Flash-WAM preserves task success on simulation benchmarks (85.5% RoboTwin 2.0, 95.7% LIBERO) and substantially recovers real-world performance (60% average on a Unitree G1 humanoid robot), while naive consistency distillation drops to 24% at the same step budget.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized. We present NRT-Bench, a benchmark for multi-turn red-teaming of LLM agents acting as operators of a safety-critical system, instantiated in a simulated nuclear power plant control room. A five-role operator team, each backed by a configurable LLM, runs a plant governed by six critical safety functions (CSFs), while adversaries inject messages over four channels in bounded multi-turn sessions with per-turn feedback. Harm is an objective signal rather than LLM-judged text: a run terminates the moment any CSF is lost, attributed to the causing message. Evaluating four frontier operator models under a fixed-attack paired-replay protocol, we find that adaptive multi-turn attacks reliably push the operator team past a safety limit: across the four models, between 8.7% and 12.1% of attack sessions end with the plant losing a critical safety function. Although the four models look almost equally robust by this aggregate rate, their failures barely overlap: of 149 sessions, none defeat all four models while a third defeat at least one, so vulnerabilities are nearly disjoint across models rather than nested. The effect of added defences is strongly model-dependent: the same guardrail stack or safety-advisor agent that lowers attack success for one model can raise it for another. We release the simulation venue, attack dataset, and replay tooling for reproducible safety evaluation of LLM agents.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, their real-world applicability has expanded significantly, accompanied by new security challenges. Most existing agent defense mechanisms adopt a mandatory checking paradigm, in which security validation is forcibly triggered at predefined stages of the agent lifecycle. In this work, we argue that effective agent security should be intrinsic and selective rather than architecturally decoupled and mandatory. We propose Spider-Sense framework, an event-driven defense framework based on Intrinsic Risk Sensing (IRS), which allows agents to maintain latent vigilance and trigger defenses only upon risk perception. Once triggered, the Spider-Sense invokes a hierarchical defence mechanism that trades off efficiency and precision: it resolves known patterns via lightweight similarity matching while escalating ambiguous cases to deep internal reasoning, thereby eliminating reliance on external models. To facilitate rigorous evaluation, we introduce S^2Bench, a lifecycle-aware benchmark featuring realistic tool execution and multi-stage attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Spider-Sense achieves competitive or superior defense performance, attaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) and False Positive Rate (FPR), with only a marginal latency overhead of 8.3\%.

Dynamical systems theory and reinforcement learning view world evolution as latent-state dynamics driven by actions, with visual observations providing partial information about the state. Recent video world models attempt to learn this action-conditioned dynamics from data. However, existing datasets rarely match the requirement: they typically lack diverse and semantically meaningful action spaces, and actions are directly tied to visual observations rather than mediated by underlying states. As a result, actions are often entangled with pixel-level changes, making it difficult for models to learn structured world dynamics and maintain consistent evolution over long horizons. In this paper, we propose WildWorld, a large-scale action-conditioned world modeling dataset with explicit state annotations, automatically collected from a photorealistic AAA action role-playing game (Monster Hunter: Wilds). WildWorld contains over 108 million frames and features more than 450 actions, including movement, attacks, and skill casting, together with synchronized per-frame annotations of character skeletons, world states, camera poses, and depth maps. We further derive WildBench to evaluate models through Action Following and State Alignment. Extensive experiments reveal persistent challenges in modeling semantically rich actions and maintaining long-horizon state consistency, highlighting the need for state-aware video generation. The project page is https://shandaai.github.io/wildworld-project/.

Modern open-world agents such as OpenClaw exhibit powerful cross-environment execution capabilities yet introduce broad new safety risk sources. Meanwhile, advanced frontier AI models drastically lower attack barriers, rendering current agent alignment frameworks inadequate for real-world deployment. To tackle these emerging threats, we propose a lightweight and scalable agent safety alignment framework. Specifically, we update the agent safety taxonomy to accommodate emergent risks from Codex and OpenClaw execution scenarios. We further build a taxonomy-guided data engine with influence-function purification to train lightweight AgentDoG 1.5 variants (0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 8B parameters) using only around 1k samples, achieving comparable performance with leading closed-source models (e.g., GPT-5.4). Based on AgentDoG 1.5, we construct a highly efficient agentic safety SFT and RL training environment, which reduces deployment overhead in Docker-level environments by two orders of magnitude. Finally, we deploy AgentDoG 1.5 as a training-free online guardrail for real-time safety moderation. Extensive experimental results indicate that AgentDoG 1.5 achieves state-of-the-art performance in diverse and complex interactive agentic scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.

Vision-language-action (VLA) models are a widely adopted paradigm for embodied policies. They excel at efficient closed-loop control but do not explicitly model how physical scenes evolve as a task unfolds. Recently emerging world-action models (WAMs) leverage pretrained video world models to capture spatiotemporal evolution, yet retaining future generation or a large video backbone in the control loop substantially increases inference cost. We introduce World Tokens, an embodied policy architecture built around a World Adapter that bridges visual-language understanding, world-dynamics modeling, and action generation. It uses world modeling during training to enhance the action policy while preserving efficient deployment. Specifically, the World Adapter transforms VLM features into a fixed set of world tokens, which condition a jointly fine-tuned future-video denoiser and simultaneously serve as the action expert's sole visual-language context. This shared conditioning allows gradients from future-video denoising to directly shape the representation used for action prediction, while exclusive routing prevents the policy from bypassing that representation. At deployment, the world-model branch is removed, leaving only the VLM, World Adapter, and action expert, with no online video-model inference. With a 2B backbone and no embodied action pretraining, World Tokens is highly competitive on LIBERO, attains the best reported averages on SIMPLER, substantially improves real-world R1 Pro success over a matched action-only baseline, and generates each action chunk at VLA-level latency.

Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad-hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.

World action models (WAMs) predict the future alongside actions during training. Due to the heavy computation cost of video denoising, whether the future must still be generated during inference is disputed: Explicit WAMs denoise it into clean frames along with every action chunk, whereas Latent WAMs discard it entirely for acceleration. We find that latent WAMs, despite matching explicit ones on in-distribution tasks, fail to retain the generalization benefits that originally motivated WAMs. To demonstrate this, we evaluate generalization along three axes: environmental perturbation, data efficiency, and task generalization. Controlled comparisons with a matched backbone, training data, and budget reveal consistent degradation across all three axes when the action expert no longer conditions on future representations. Further analysis shows that the gap arises almost entirely from the first denoising step: the benefit comes from preparing the future, not generating it. We therefore propose Simple-WAM, which simplifies future modeling into a single forward pass of fully noised video tokens and adapts the training-time noise schedule to this inference behavior. Across simulation and real-world tasks, Simple-WAM achieves the best of both worlds, leading explicit WAMs in generalization performance with efficiency comparable to Latent WAMs. Project Page: https://zrporz.github.io/Simple-WAM-Web/

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

Machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are critical for securing Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. Most adversarial research against them perturbs the feature vector or the traffic that produces it, and depends on gradient access, repeated model queries, or a learned model of benign traffic. A smaller line of work reshapes packet timing without querying the detector, but makes malicious traffic mimic a learned model of benign timing. Across these approaches, one assumption of industrial monitoring pipelines has received little attention: temporal synchronization. An IDS reconstructs operational state by aggregating telemetry into sliding or tumbling windows, so its view depends not only on what is observed but on when each observation falls relative to a window boundary. We introduce the Phantom State Attack (PSA), which exploits that dependence under a passive, zero-query threat model. Rather than modifying packets, perturbing features, querying the classifier, or fitting any model of benign traffic, PSA injects bounded timing drift calibrated to the attack flow's own inter-arrival variability, moving observations across the nearest window boundary by the minimal shift needed. The IDS then reconstructs a phantom state that diverges from the true process state. We evaluate PSA on ToN-IoT and CIC IIoT 2025 (DataSense), against Random Forest, MLP and XGBoost, measuring detection degradation, synchronization distortion, stealth, and attacker cost. PSA degrades detection on flows carrying enough packets for window-boundary redistribution, and leaves others almost unchanged, so its effect is conditional. A query-based baseline reaches higher raw success but needs many queries per window, while PSA needs none. The results identify temporal aggregation as an attack surface reachable under weaker assumptions than prior evasion techniques.

As the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and systems have surged, IoT data analytics techniques have been developed to detect malicious cyber-attacks and secure IoT systems; however, concept drift issues often occur in IoT data analytics, as IoT data is often dynamic data streams that change over time, causing model degradation and attack detection failure. This is because traditional data analytics models are static models that cannot adapt to data distribution changes. In this paper, we propose a Performance Weighted Probability Averaging Ensemble (PWPAE) framework for drift adaptive IoT anomaly detection through IoT data stream analytics. Experiments on two public datasets show the effectiveness of our proposed PWPAE method compared against state-of-the-art methods.

Components of cyber physical systems, which affect real-world processes, are often exposed to the internet. Replacing conventional control methods with Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) in energy systems is an active area of research, as these systems become increasingly complex with the advent of renewable energy sources and the desire to improve their efficiency. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are vulnerable to specific perturbations of their inputs or features, called adversarial examples. These perturbations are difficult to detect when properly regularized, but have significant effects on the ANN's output. Because DRL uses ANN to map optimal actions to observations, they are similarly vulnerable to adversarial examples. This work proposes a novel attack technique for continuous control using Group Difference Logits loss with a bifurcation layer. By combining aspects of targeted and untargeted attacks, the attack significantly increases the impact compared to an untargeted attack, with drastically smaller distortions than an optimally targeted attack. We demonstrate the impacts of powerful gradient-based attacks in a realistic smart energy environment, show how the impacts change with different DRL agents and training procedures, and use statistical and time-series analysis to evaluate attacks' stealth. The results show that adversarial attacks can have significant impacts on DRL controllers, and constraining an attack's perturbations makes it difficult to detect. However, certain DRL architectures are far more robust, and robust training methods can further reduce the impact.

Robust robotic manipulation in the real world requires not only an understanding of the current observation, but also memory and dynamics modeling. World action models (WAMs) possess these capabilities by jointly modeling visual foresight and actions conditioned on both current and historical observations, making them a promising paradigm for robotic manipulation. However, existing WAMs face a fundamental trade-off: methods with efficient inference typically condition only on a bounded window of recent observations and therefore struggle in non-Markovian environments, whereas methods that preserve long histories incur time and space costs that grow substantially with sequence length. To address this challenge, we introduce MemoryWAM, a world action model with efficient persistent memory. MemoryWAM uses a hybrid memory design that combines recent frames, event-boundary anchor frames, and compact gist tokens that summarize long-range history. A tailored attention mechanism enables retrieval of both detailed short-term context and compressed long-term context, supporting memory-dependent decision-making with reduced inference latency and GPU memory usage. Across long-horizon, memory-dependent manipulation tasks in both simulation and the real world, MemoryWAM outperforms strong vision-language-action (VLA) and WAM baselines while maintaining favorable computational efficiency.

World action models (WAMs) improve robot control by modeling how observations evolve, but generating future observations at test time incurs substantial latency. Fast-WAM removes this process for efficiency; however, our matched implementations show lower generalization for Fast-WAM than for future-aware alternatives, especially with scarce robot demonstrations and in out-of-distribution scenarios. To bridge this gap, we introduce **LAWA**, a WAM architecture that uses compact latent actions as an operational representation of future intentions, enabling efficient test-time future imagination without generating future observations. Specifically, a discrete tokenizer enhanced by action-free pre-training produces manipulation-centric codebook targets. LAWA jointly denoises a continuous latent state anchored to these targets with executable action chunks while omitting the future-video branch at inference. On RoboCasa, LAWA achieves state-of-the-art average success rates of 65.6% and 80.8% in the few-shot and full data settings, improving over the matched Fast-WAM baseline by 9.6 and 4.5 points, respectively. It also preserves the performance level of the matched Joint-WAM variant while requiring 42.9% lower inference latency. LAWA also demonstrates competitive zero-shot robustness on LIBERO-Plus and superior performance on real-world tasks. These results show that future imagination need not be discarded: retaining it with compact latent actions yields an effective trade-off among performance, generalization, and latency. Code and models will be released.

As large language models improve, so do their offensive applications: frontier agents now generate working exploits for under $50 in compute (Heelan, 2026). Defensive incident response (IR) agents must keep pace, but existing benchmarks conflate action execution with correct execution, hiding calibration failures when agents process adversarial evidence. We introduce OpenSec, a dual-control reinforcement learning environment that evaluates IR agents under realistic prompt injection scenarios. Unlike static capability benchmarks, OpenSec scores world-state-changing containment actions under adversarial evidence via execution-based metrics: time-to-first-containment (TTFC), blast radius (false positives per episode), and injection violation rates. Evaluating four frontier models on 40 standard-tier episodes, we find consistent over-triggering in this setting: GPT-5.2, Gemini 3, and DeepSeek execute containment in 100% of episodes with 90-97% false positive rates. Claude Sonnet 4.5 shows partial calibration (85% containment, 72% FP), demonstrating that OpenSec surfaces a calibration failure mode hidden by aggregate success metrics. Code available at https://github.com/jbarnes850/opensec-env.

Despite rapid progress in LLM agents, performance on long-horizon, tool-using tasks remains fragile. To better understand this fragility, we ask a simple question: do all actions contribute equally to failure? Analyzing execution traces on τ-Bench (Airline/Retail) and SWE-Bench Verified, we decompose trajectories into mutating (environment-changing) vs.\ non-mutating steps and formalize decisive deviations, earliest action, level divergences that flip success to failure. A logistic regression reveals that each additional deviation in a mutating action reduces the odds of success by upto 92% on Airline and upto 96% on Retail for SoTA models. In contrast, deviations in non-mutating actions have little to no effect. Errors also grow with context length as agents drift from role and act on stale constraints. Motivated by these observations, we introduce , a model-agnostic, gradient-free, test-time safeguard that (i) adds mutation-gated verification, (ii) injects Targeted Reflection before mutating steps, and (iii) performs block-based context cleaning. delivers consistent gains, e.g., Qwen3-Thinking: +28\% relative on Airline, +11\% on Retail, and +7\% on SWE-Bench Verified; Claude: +9\%/+7\%. We further identify ceiling effects in τ-Bench, where annotation errors and underspecified tasks artificially cap model performance. To address this, we release τ-Bench Verified, which restores benchmark headroom through targeted revisions. Our results argue for action-level analysis, targeted safeguards, and reliable evaluations as prerequisites for robust multi-turn agents.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models enable robots to interpret natural-language instructions and perform diverse tasks, yet their integration of perception, language, and control introduces new safety vulnerabilities. Despite growing interest in attacking such models, the effectiveness of existing techniques remains unclear due to the absence of a unified evaluation framework. One major issue is that differences in action tokenizers across VLA architectures hinder reproducibility and fair comparison. More importantly, most existing attacks have not been validated in real-world scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose AttackVLA, a unified framework that aligns with the VLA development lifecycle, covering data construction, model training, and inference. Within this framework, we implement a broad suite of attacks, including all existing attacks targeting VLAs and multiple adapted attacks originally developed for vision-language models, and evaluate them in both simulation and real-world settings. Our analysis of existing attacks reveals a critical gap: current methods tend to induce untargeted failures or static action states, leaving targeted attacks that drive VLAs to perform precise long-horizon action sequences largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we introduce BackdoorVLA, a targeted backdoor attack that compels a VLA to execute an attacker-specified long-horizon action sequence whenever a trigger is present. We evaluate BackdoorVLA in both simulated benchmarks and real-world robotic settings, achieving an average targeted success rate of 58.4% and reaching 100% on selected tasks. Our work provides a standardized framework for evaluating VLA vulnerabilities and demonstrates the potential for precise adversarial manipulation, motivating further research on securing VLA-based embodied systems.

Generalist web agents have evolved rapidly and demonstrated remarkable potential. However, there are unprecedented safety risks associated with these them, which are nearly unexplored so far. In this work, we aim to narrow this gap by conducting the first study on the privacy risks of generalist web agents in adversarial environments. First, we present a threat model that discusses the adversarial targets, constraints, and attack scenarios. Particularly, we consider two types of adversarial targets: stealing users' specific personally identifiable information (PII) or stealing the entire user request. To achieve these objectives, we propose a novel attack method, termed Environmental Injection Attack (EIA). This attack injects malicious content designed to adapt well to different environments where the agents operate, causing them to perform unintended actions. This work instantiates EIA specifically for the privacy scenario. It inserts malicious web elements alongside persuasive instructions that mislead web agents into leaking private information, and can further leverage CSS and JavaScript features to remain stealthy. We collect 177 actions steps that involve diverse PII categories on realistic websites from the Mind2Web dataset, and conduct extensive experiments using one of the most capable generalist web agent frameworks to date, SeeAct. The results demonstrate that EIA achieves up to 70% ASR in stealing users' specific PII. Stealing full user requests is more challenging, but a relaxed version of EIA can still achieve 16% ASR. Despite these concerning results, it is important to note that the attack can still be detectable through careful human inspection, highlighting a trade-off between high autonomy and security. This leads to our detailed discussion on the efficacy of EIA under different levels of human supervision as well as implications on defenses for generalist web agents.

World Action Models (WAMs) jointly predict future video and generate actions, yet remain sensitive to task-irrelevant visual perturbations, i.e., changes in visual appearance that should not affect robot behavior. We identify a gap in conventional WAM training: video prediction encourages representations to preserve appearance information, while action generation does not explicitly enforce invariance to task-irrelevant appearance. Data augmentation exposes WAMs to such perturbations but does not require perturbed and nominal observations to produce consistent action representations, and alignment with external pretrained features does not guarantee the desired invariance. To address this gap, we propose PICA-WAM, a self-supervised training framework that casts perturbation invariance as an auxiliary cross-appearance self-alignment task for WAMs. An exponential-moving-average (EMA) teacher processes the nominal observation to provide a deeper-layer target, while the online WAM processes a perturbed observation and aligns its shallower-layer action representation to this target through a lightweight projection head. Across four strong WAMs evaluated on RoboTwin 2.0, LIBERO-Plus, EBench, and a real robot, PICA-WAM consistently improves robustness under visual perturbations, preserves nominal performance in simulation, and raises the real robot success rate. PICA-WAM further reduces the sensitivity of video features to task-irrelevant appearance and its propagation into actions, as shown by paired layer-wise diagnostics. Code: https://github.com/YudeZou/PICA-WAM-release

Generative world models aim to predict future states conditioned on actions, where action controllability is fundamental for reliable dynamics modeling. While recent efforts leverage simulator-generated data to enhance this capability, existing training pipelines face two fundamental limitations. First, static offline data collection leads to a distribution misalignment between training sets and the model's evolving error patterns, failing to resolve critical long-tail scenarios where dynamics predictions remain unreliable. Second, the standard objective of minimizing observational discrepancy often encourages the model to exploit spurious correlations instead of capturing the underlying action-effect causality. To address these limitations, we propose OnlineWM, an online training framework that continuously improves world modeling through active simulator interaction and causality-aware optimization. OnlineWM introduces two key innovations: (1) Active Online Learning: Instead of using fixed datasets, OnlineWM adaptively queries the simulator for new interaction sequences that target the model's current predictive weaknesses, ensuring high-utility data acquisition. (2) Causality-Aware Fine-Tuning: We propose a counterfactual learning strategy that contrasts the outcomes of different actions from identical states, forcing the model to attribute state transitions to specific actions rather than ambient environmental evolution, thereby grounding its predictions in reliable causal mechanisms. By integrating active data acquisition with causal optimization, OnlineWM establishes a closed-loop refinement process that ensures the model is both robust to diverse scenarios and precise in its causal attribution. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OnlineWM significantly enhances action controllability and generalizes effectively to unseen domains.

Recent computer-using-agent (CUA) red-teaming papers report prompt-injection attack success rates (ASR) of 42-98%, but these headline numbers cluster on retired models and on the most-vulnerable model in each paper's panel. We ask whether those techniques, reproduced as hand-crafted templates, still work against current frontier CUAs. We release CUA-HandCrafted, a public benchmark of 793 episodes spanning 24 multi-step web tasks, 56 attack templates, 8 attack families, and 4 system-prompt configurations. Against Claude Sonnet 4.6 and GPT-5.4 we measure 0/140 multi-step attack success (Clopper-Pearson 95% upper bound 2.60%); a prompt ablation shows this resistance lives in the model weights. Yet it does not generalize: on a sister coding-agent benchmark (SkillBench), the same weights fall to hand-crafted skill-injection at up to 100%. We argue that the literature's high ASR is largely attributable to RL-optimized injection text rather than the attack categories, and that frontier safety hardening is domain-conditioned, specific to the heavily-targeted browser surface. Reporting techniques without releasing the optimized strings, or extrapolating browser-domain safety to other CUA modalities, makes published ASR numbers unreproducible.

World models enable planning in imagined future predicted space, offering a promising framework for embodied navigation. However, existing navigation world models often lack action-conditioned consistency, so visually plausible predictions can still drift under multi-step rollout and degrade planning. Moreover, efficient deployment requires few-step diffusion inference, but existing distillation methods do not explicitly preserve rollout consistency, creating a training-inference mismatch. To address these challenges, we propose MWM, a mobile world model for planning-based image-goal navigation. Specifically, we introduce a two-stage training framework that combines structure pretraining with Action-Conditioned Consistency (ACC) post-training to improve action-conditioned rollout consistency. We further introduce Inference-Consistent State Distillation (ICSD) for few-step diffusion distillation with improved rollout consistency. Our experiments on benchmark and real-world tasks demonstrate consistent gains in visual fidelity, trajectory accuracy, planning success, and inference efficiency. Code: https://github.com/AIGeeksGroup/MWM. Website: https://aigeeksgroup.github.io/MWM.

AI agents operate in persistent environments where early state changes can influence decisions far into the future. Unlike conventional language-model interactions, agent behavior is mediated through a shared state that is repeatedly modified and reused across long-horizon workflows. Current safety benchmarks often fail to capture these cumulative risks because they focus on short, static tasks. To address these limitations, we introduce OpenART, an open-ended arena for scalable agent red teaming through environment evolution. OpenART provides over 10,000 validated stateful scenarios across 50 domains, drawing from a pool of more than 500,000 tools and skills. These tasks require a median of 97 tool calls and enable unified evaluation across 75 different agent-model configurations. To systematically explore these evolving attack surfaces, we propose the Evolutionary Markov Hypergraph Attack (EMHA). EMHA is a black-box policy that performs feedback-driven environment evolution by coordinating authorized state transitions without requiring parameter updates. Throughout the evaluation, task objectives remain fixed while only the environment state changes. Across all configurations, EMHA achieves a pooled Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 85.0%. Its advantage over instruction-only evolution increases from approximately 2% on simple environments to over 17% on the most complex ones, demonstrating that environment evolution increasingly exposes safety failures as task complexity grows. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the specific runtime implementation of an agent explains a significant portion of safety variation beyond the underlying model's capabilities. These results establish OpenART as a scalable foundation for studying agent safety in complex, evolving environments.

Recent advances in vision-language-action (VLA) models have greatly improved embodied AI, enabling robots to follow natural language instructions and perform diverse tasks. However, their reliance on uncurated training datasets raises serious security concerns. Existing backdoor attacks on VLAs mostly assume white-box access and result in task failures instead of enforcing specific actions. In this work, we reveal a more practical threat: attackers can manipulate VLAs by simply injecting physical objects as triggers into the training dataset. We propose goal-oriented backdoor attacks (GoBA), where the VLA behaves normally in the absence of physical triggers but executes predefined and goal-oriented actions in the presence of physical triggers. Specifically, based on a popular VLA benchmark LIBERO, we introduce BadLIBERO that incorporates diverse physical triggers and goal-oriented backdoor actions. In addition, we propose a three-level evaluation that categorizes the victim VLA's actions under GoBA into three states: nothing to do, try to do, and success to do. Experiments show that GoBA enables the victim VLA to successfully achieve the backdoor goal in 97 percentage of inputs when the physical trigger is present, while causing zero performance degradation on clean inputs. Finally, by investigating factors related to GoBA, we find that the action trajectory and trigger color significantly influence attack performance, while trigger size has surprisingly little effect. The code and BadLIBERO dataset are accessible via the project page at https://goba-attack.github.io/.

World models have been emerging as critical components for assessing the consequences of actions generated by interactive agents in online planning and offline evaluation. In text-based environments, world models are typically evaluated and trained with single-step metrics such as Exact Match, aiming to improve the similarity between predicted and real-world states, but such metrics have been shown to be insufficient for capturing actual agent behavior. To address this issue, we introduce a new behavior-aligned training paradigm aimed at improving the functional consistency between the world model and the real environment. This paradigm focuses on optimizing a tractable step-level metric named Behavior Consistency Reward (BehR), which measures how much the likelihood of a logged next action changes between the real state and the world-model-predicted state under a frozen Reference Agent. Experiments on WebShop and TextWorld show that BehR-based training improves long-term alignment in several settings, with the clearest gains in WebShop and less movement in near-ceiling regimes, while preserving or improving single-step prediction quality in three of four settings. World models trained with BehR also achieve lower false positives in offline surrogate evaluation and show modest but encouraging gains in inference-time lookahead planning.

The integration of vision-language-action (VLA) models into embodied AI (EAI) robots is rapidly advancing their ability to perform complex, long-horizon tasks in humancentric environments. However, EAI systems introduce critical security risks: a compromised VLA model can directly translate adversarial perturbations on sensory input into unsafe physical actions. Traditional safety definitions and methodologies from the machine learning community are no longer sufficient. EAI systems raise new questions, such as what constitutes safety, how to measure it, and how to design effective attack and defense mechanisms in physically grounded, interactive settings. In this work, we present the first systematic study of adversarial safety attacks on embodied AI systems, grounded in ISO standards for human-robot interactions. We (1) formalize a principled taxonomy of safety violations (critical, dangerous, risky) based on physical constraints such as separation distance, velocity, and collision boundaries; (2) introduce ANNIEBench, a benchmark of nine safety-critical scenarios with 2,400 video-action sequences for evaluating embodied safety; and (3) ANNIE-Attack, a task-aware adversarial framework with an attack leader model that decomposes long-horizon goals into frame-level perturbations. Our evaluation across representative EAI models shows attack success rates exceeding 50% across all safety categories. We further demonstrate sparse and adaptive attack strategies and validate the real-world impact through physical robot experiments. These results expose a previously underexplored but highly consequential attack surface in embodied AI systems, highlighting the urgent need for security-driven defenses in the physical AI era. Code is available at https://github.com/RLCLab/Annie.

World Action Models (WAMs) augment robot policies with action-conditioned predicted futures, but a plausible future alone does not justify changing the action that a bimanual policy would execute. We present CoWAM, a selective intervention layer that expresses synchronization, role compatibility, and collision convergence as coordination contracts. Each contract combines typed admissibility checks with event-conditioned verification and calibrated intervention gates. CoWAM preserves the nominal action unless an alternative satisfies every active obligation and provides a clear, low-risk improvement; when the nominal action is also inadmissible, it invokes a predefined abstention fallback. To separate selector quality from proposal quality, all methods operate on identical candidate pools and commit their decisions before shared oracle labeling. Across eight simulated bimanual tasks, CoWAM improves coordination-valid selection by 16.7 percentage points over the contract-only variant and raises closed-loop success by 9.6 percentage points over the strongest selective baseline, while keeping harmful interventions below 1%. Together, these results establish coordination contracts as an effective interface for conservative policy intervention with predicted world-action evidence across coordination-rich bimanual tasks.

With advances in imitation learning (IL) and large-scale driving datasets, end-to-end autonomous driving (E2E-AD) has made great progress recently. Currently, IL-based methods have become a mainstream paradigm: models rely on standard driving behaviors given by experts, and learn to minimize the discrepancy between their actions and expert actions. However, this objective of "only driving like the expert" suffers from limited generalization: when encountering rare or unseen long-tail scenarios outside the distribution of expert demonstrations, models tend to produce unsafe decisions in the absence of prior experience. This raises a fundamental question: Can an E2E-AD system make reliable decisions without any expert action supervision? Motivated by this, we propose a unified framework named Risk-aware World Model Predictive Control (RaWMPC) to address this generalization dilemma through robust control, without reliance on expert demonstrations. Practically, RaWMPC leverages a world model to predict the consequences of multiple candidate actions and selects low-risk actions through explicit risk evaluation. To endow the world model with the ability to predict the outcomes of risky driving behaviors, we design a risk-aware interaction strategy that systematically exposes the world model to hazardous behaviors, making catastrophic outcomes predictable and thus avoidable. Furthermore, to generate low-risk candidate actions at test time, we introduce a self-evaluation distillation method to distill riskavoidance capabilities from the well-trained world model into a generative action proposal network without any expert demonstration. Extensive experiments show that RaWMPC outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios, while providing superior decision interpretability.

World Action Models (WAMs) have emerged as a powerful paradigm for embodied intelligence, yet the prevailing reliance on pixel-level video generation creates a fundamental bottleneck. Forcing models to reconstruct task-irrelevant visual details dissipates representational capacity and renders policies vulnerable to visual distractors. In this paper, we propose LeapBot-WA, which establishes a novel Predictive-Latent paradigm for WAMs by operationalizing the Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) as a World-Anchor. Departing from the traditional reliance on visual synthesis, LeapBot-WA shifts the core of world modeling to Predictive Semantic Alignment, extracting abstract physical dynamics directly within a latent foundation space. To bridge the modality gap between non-Gaussian predictive features and diffusion priors, we introduce the Isotropic Semantic Autoencoder (ISAE), which reshapes the anchor's latent space into a diffusion-friendly manifold to prevent off-manifold drift. Furthermore, we design an Asymmetric Mixture-of-Transformers (MoT) architecture. During training, an Anchor Diffusion Transformer acts as a privileged dynamics expert to guide the Action Diffusion Transformer; at inference, this heavy dynamics branch is pruned, enabling zero-overhead execution. LeapBot-WA achieves state-of-the-art performance among predictive models on LIBERO and matches top-tier generative WAMs on RoboTwin 2.0 without requiring large-scale trajectory pre-training. It further demonstrates superior zero-shot robustness to unseen environments and successful real-world transfer, establishing a highly efficient and robust latent-centric paradigm for scalable robotic control. Code: https://github.com/LeapWM/leapbot-wa.

This study exposes the safety vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions, where malicious users can obscure harmful intents across several queries. We introduce ActorAttack, a novel multi-turn attack method inspired by actor-network theory, which models a network of semantically linked actors as attack clues to generate diverse and effective attack paths toward harmful targets. ActorAttack addresses two main challenges in multi-turn attacks: (1) concealing harmful intents by creating an innocuous conversation topic about the actor, and (2) uncovering diverse attack paths towards the same harmful target by leveraging LLMs' knowledge to specify the correlated actors as various attack clues. In this way, ActorAttack outperforms existing single-turn and multi-turn attack methods across advanced aligned LLMs, even for GPT-o1. We will publish a dataset called SafeMTData, which includes multi-turn adversarial prompts and safety alignment data, generated by ActorAttack. We demonstrate that models safety-tuned using our safety dataset are more robust to multi-turn attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/renqibing/ActorAttack.

AI agents are demonstrating increasingly strong offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities in the real world. Current benchmarks mostly evaluate agents in isolation against static targets. Real cyber operations, however, are dynamic and coupled: security postures constantly change as attackers and defenders adapt to each other in real time. Static benchmarks quickly saturate and miss an agent's ability to attack and defend simultaneously under live pressure. To address this gap, we present CyberArena, a dynamic, symmetric adversarial benchmark built around multi-round attack-and-defense combat. In isolated sandboxes, two agents compete under identical rules, acting concurrently as both attackers and defenders over continuously changing services. This converts static targets into evolving, semi-open challenges, directly testing an agent's speed and precision in discovering, exploiting, and patching vulnerabilities. To sustain the benchmark's longevity, an automated agentic pipeline continuously generates, reviews, and validates new environments. Furthermore, because pairwise contests are notoriously hard to quantify, we introduce a dynamical model that maps match dynamics into unified, multidimensional scores across offensive, defensive, and domain-specific capabilities. Evaluating 12 frontier LLM agents across 40 challenges in 466 matches, CyberArena separates model capabilities where single-agent baselines hit a ceiling. The trajectories read like a fight rather than an exam: defenders patch one hole and miss the next and certify repairs on stale evidence, while capable agents think a move ahead, planting backdoors for later rounds and, in one case, writing their own packet sniffer to watch the opponent. Beyond a benchmark, CyberArena serves as an adaptable, scalable experimental platform for future research on cybersecurity agents.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Chunk-autoregressive video world models typically condition each generated chunk on one action. An action received during sampling must therefore wait for the next chunk, condition future solver evaluations on a state produced under the previous action, or trigger rollback that repeats completed evaluations. We introduce ActionSplice, an inference framework that formulates this problem as Counterfactual State Transport (CST). A lightweight corrector transports the interrupted backbone-native representation toward the matched state induced by the revised action at the same solver step. The world model and sampler remain frozen, and sampling resumes without replaying completed evaluations. The retargeting variant CST*{R} updates the entire active chunk, while the temporal-splicing variant CST*{T} preserves a temporal prefix and updates only the suffix. Across minWM-Wan Action2V and HY-WM1.5, CST*{R} reduces rollback-relative LPIPS by 61.5% and 75.9% relative to direct condition swapping. CST*{T} reduces suffix LPIPS by 56.1% and 77.5%, respectively, while providing 2.73times and 1.69times pixel-ready speedups over waiting. Under the HY-WorldPlay protocol, CST_{R} obtains a PSNR of 25.66 dB, an SSIM of 0.6902, and an LPIPS of 0.1337 against the original rollout.

The agent--tool interaction loop is a critical attack surface for modern Large Language Model (LLM) agents. Existing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks typically function at the user-prompt or retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) context layer and are inherently single-turn in nature. This limitation restricts cost amplification and diminishes stealth in goal-oriented workflows. To address these issues, we proposed a stealthy, multi-turn economic DoS attack at the tool layer under the Model Context Protocol (MCP). By simply editing text-visible fields and implementing a template-driven return policy, our malicious server preserves function signatures and the terminal benign payload while steering agents into prolonged, verbose tool-calling chains. We optimize these text-only edits with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to maximize cost under a task-success constraint. Across six LLMs on ToolBench and BFCL benchmarks, our attack yields trajectories over 60K tokens, increases per-query cost by up to 658 times, raises energy by 100 to 560 times, and pushes GPU key-value (KV) cache occupancy to 35--74%. Standard prompt filters and output trajectory monitors seldom detect these attacks, highlighting the need for defenses that safeguard agentic processes rather than focusing solely on final outcomes. We will release the code soon.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

The goal of a world model is to capture the dynamics of an environment. This has the great appeal that it allows agents to plan and simulate a course of actions with the help of a world model. For these uses to be reliable, however, the learned dynamics must behave well beyond the specific state-action combinations observed in expert rollouts. Despite this, the relationship between data coverage, dynamics generalization, and downstream planning performance remains underexplored. We study this relationship through the lens of compositional generalization: can a world model recombine familiar state and action factors into valid dynamics? To answer this, we introduce AnyGoal, a benchmark of goal-shifted task variants built from widely used world-model environments, together with an open-source library. Each task is designed to be within reach of a world model that has learned the underlying dynamics: individual state factors and actions remain within their training support, but their combinations are underrepresented in expert trajectories. Across multiple environments and world model families, we find that current models consistently exhibit failures under these recombinations. By examining dynamics and representation failures across model families, interaction regimes, and evaluation metrics, we study where current world models generalize and where challenges remain for goal-shifted prediction and planning. Together, this framework, benchmark, and analysis provide a basis for evaluating progress toward world models that generalize to new planning tasks.

Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions. In this paper, we introduce MAGIC, a novel multi-turn multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that formulates LLM safety alignment as an adversarial asymmetric game. Specifically, an attacker agent learns to iteratively rewrite original queries into deceptive prompts, while a defender agent simultaneously optimizes its policy to recognize and refuse such inputs. This dynamic process triggers a co-evolution, where the attacker's ever-changing strategies continuously uncover long-tail vulnerabilities, driving the defender to generalize to unseen attack patterns. Remarkably, we observe that the attacker, endowed with initial reasoning ability, evolves novel, previously unseen combinatorial strategies through iterative RL training, underscoring our method's substantial potential. Theoretically, we provide insights into a more robust game equilibrium and derive safety guarantees. Extensive experiments validate our framework's effectiveness, demonstrating superior defense success rates without compromising the helpfulness of the model. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/MAGIC.

As LLM-based agents increasingly browse the web on users' behalf, a natural question arises: can websites passively identify which underlying model powers an agent? Doing so would represent a significant security risk, enabling targeted attacks tailored to known model vulnerabilities. Across 14 frontier LLMs and four web environments spanning information retrieval and shopping tasks, we show that an agent's actions and interaction timings, captured via a passive JavaScript tracker, are sufficient to identify the underlying model with up to 96\% F1. We formalise this attack surface by demonstrating that classifiers trained on agent actions generalise across model sizes and families. We further show that strong classifiers can be trained from few interaction traces and that agent identity can be inferred early within an episode. Injecting randomised timing delays between actions substantially degrades classifier performance, but does not provide robust protection: a classifier retrained on delayed traces largely recovers performance. We release our harness and a labelled corpus of agent traces https://github.com/KabakaWilliam/known_actions{here}.

We study behavioral alignment and representation dynamics of large language model (LLM) agents in financial decision environments. TradeArena, an auditable trading-agent testbed with risk reports, execution simulation, memory, and replayable trajectories, lets us analyze how rationales, positions, and interventions evolve under market stress. Code and data artifacts are available through the https://github.com/weich97/TradeArena.git{TradeArena repository}. We find pre-failure signatures: planning embeddings drift from normal centroids, fused plan-risk representations separate normal from pre-drawdown states, and local manifolds exhibit effective-rank contraction. Across 80 rolling failure anchors and eight LLM trajectories, this pattern persists across hash, LSA, Transformer, and white-box hidden-state probes. Stress tests with CoT-free target weights, lexical controls, OHLCV noise, and false audits show that rationale-level contraction can vanish without rationales, while intent-space and fused signatures remain informative. Structured risk feedback can act as an external alignment signal without fine-tuning, but not as a universal performance enhancer: true audit feedback improves calibration for some models, returns for others, and exposes cases where placebo or hidden feedback has higher short-horizon return but weaker alignment diagnostics. A 51-stock intraday experiment reveals a correlation blind spot: LLM rationales justify exposure to coupled assets that the risk layer clips. Finally, a financial-audit task suite shifts comparison from ``which model trades best'' to whether models can audit trajectories, respect execution boundaries, reproduce artifacts, and avoid claim overreach. These results support a research claim, not a profitability claim: auditable risk feedback and representation trajectories reveal when LLM financial reasoning is aligning, drifting, or failing.

Computer-use agents provide a promising path toward general software automation because they can interact directly with arbitrary graphical user interfaces instead of relying on brittle, application-specific integrations. Despite recent advances in benchmark performance, strong computer-use agents remain expensive and slow in practice, since most systems invoke large multimodal models at nearly every interaction step. We argue that this uniform allocation of compute is fundamentally inefficient for long-horizon GUI tasks. Such trajectories are highly heterogeneous: many steps are routine and can be handled reliably by smaller, cheaper policies, while errors tend to concentrate at a relatively small number of high-risk moments. Across computer-use benchmarks, these failures repeatedly take two forms: progress stalls, where the agent loops, repeats ineffective actions, or fails to make meaningful progress, and silent semantic drift, where the agent continues taking locally plausible actions after already deviating from the user's true goal. To address this inefficiency, we propose an event-driven, step-level cascade for computer-use agents that runs a small policy by default and escalates to a stronger model only when lightweight learned monitors detect elevated risk. Our framework combines two complementary signals: a Stuck Monitor that detects degraded progress from recent reasoning-action history and triggers recovery, and a Milestone Monitor that identifies semantically meaningful checkpoints where sparse verification is most informative for catching drift. This design turns always-on frontier-model inference into adaptive, on-demand compute allocation over the course of an evolving interaction. The framework is modular and deployment-oriented: it can be layered on top of existing computer-use agents without changing the underlying agent architecture or retraining the large model.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

World Action Models (WAMs) jointly model action generation and environment dynamics and are mostly built on pretrained Video Diffusion Models (VDMs). In VDM-based WAMs, observations are first encoded by a VAE, and the resulting compressed latents are then processed by large video diffusion backbones to extract effective features for action generation. However, this paradigm ties WAM performance and training cost to large-scale video generation pretraining, limiting WAM efficiency and scalability. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically investigate how visual representations affect action generation in WAMs. Our results show that predictive embeddings from Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) encoders better support action generation than compressed VAE latents, with I-JEPA performing best in our encoder comparison. Based on these findings, we propose LeWAM, which conditions action generation on JEPA embeddings and models environment evolution by predicting future embeddings in the same space, without relying on a video diffusion backbone. We further find that imitation learning matches demonstrated actions but does not distinguish better actions from worse ones, even though small action deviations can greatly affect task success. To address this limitation without additional environment interaction or the human oversight required for resets and safety, we introduce Demonstration-Guided DPO (DemoDPO), an offline preference refinement stage that derives preference supervision directly from demonstrations.With only 0.4B trainable parameters, LeWAM achieves an average success rate of 92.28\% on RoboTwin 2.0, comparable to that of state-of-the-art VLAs and WAMs, and maintains practical effectiveness on real-world manipulation tasks.

As autonomous agents (e.g., OpenClaw) increasingly operate with deep system-level privileges to execute complex tasks, they introduce severe, unmitigated security risks. Current vulnerability analyses overwhelmingly focus on single-turn, stateless behaviors, overlooking the expanded attack surface inherent in stateful, multi-turn interactions and dynamic tool invocations. In this paper, we propose a novel, multi-dimensional evasion framework targeting LLM-based agent systems. We introduce three stealthy attack vectors: (1) Temporal evasion, which fragments malicious payloads across sequential interaction turns; (2) Spatial evasion, which conceals payloads within complex external artifacts that evade standard LLM parsing mechanisms; and (3) Semantic evasion, which obscures malicious intents beneath benign contextual noise. To systematically quantify these threats, we construct A3S-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 2,254 real-world agent execution trajectories. Evaluating a standard agent framework separately integrated with 10 mainstream LLM backbones against 20 practical threat scenarios, we demonstrate that our evasion framework elevates the average risk trigger rate from a 28.3\% baseline to 52.6\%. These findings reveal systemic, architecture-level vulnerabilities in current autonomous agent systems that existing defenses fail to address, highlighting an urgent need for defense mechanisms tailored to the unique threats.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in production, yet their security evaluations remain bottlenecked by manual red-teaming or static benchmarks that fail to model adaptive, multi-turn adversaries. We propose NAAMSE, an evolutionary framework that reframes agent security evaluation as a feedback-driven optimization problem. Our system employs a single autonomous agent that orchestrates a lifecycle of genetic prompt mutation, hierarchical corpus exploration, and asymmetric behavioral scoring. By using model responses as a fitness signal, the framework iteratively compounds effective attack strategies while simultaneously ensuring "benign-use correctness", preventing the degenerate security of blanket refusal. Our experiments on Gemini 2.5 Flash demonstrate that evolutionary mutation systematically amplifies vulnerabilities missed by one-shot methods, with controlled ablations revealing that the synergy between exploration and targeted mutation uncovers high-severity failure modes. We show that this adaptive approach provides a more realistic and scalable assessment of agent robustness in the face of evolving threats. The code for NAAMSE is open source and available at https://github.com/HASHIRU-AI/NAAMSE.